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The two-step interrogation tactic at issue in Missouri v. Seibert
exemplifies gaming by observing a rule while undermining its
purpose.1
The Seibert opinions have sown confusion in federal and state
courts, which have attempted to divine the governing standard that
applies in successive interrogation cases involving warned and
unwarned confessions.2

1. Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1407, 1439 (2011).
2. State v. O’Neill, 936 A.2d 438, 453 (N.J. 2007).
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INTRODUCTION
On August 6, 2010, Russell Hart was arrested in Nebraska on a
parole violation originating in California.3 At the local jail, a police
officer asked Hart what the underlying charge was with respect to the
parole violation.4 Hart stated that he had failed to register as a sex
offender in California.5 A deputy sheriff then asked Hart how long
he had lived in Nebraska.6 When Hart responded that he had lived in
Nebraska for approximately one month, another officer asked Hart if
he had registered in Nebraska.7 Hart responded that he had not
registered.8 At this point, the questioning, which had included no
mention of Miranda warnings, paused while the police left to discuss
Hart’s statement regarding his failure to register.9 Believing Hart had
indicated an “Adam Walsh” violation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–
16991 by failing to register, the police quickly confirmed their
suspicion with the Marshall’s Office in Lincoln, Nebraska, and
returned to the interrogation room.10

3. United States v. Hart, No. 4:10CR3088, 2010 WL 5422900, at *1 (D. Neb. Nov.
30, 2010).
4. Id.
5. Id. Hart had to register as a sex offender because he was convicted of rape in
1975, which required the convict to register subsequently as a sex offender in the
state where he resides. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); see also United States v. Hart,
No. 4:10CR3088, 2010 WL 5422900 (D. Neb. Nov. 30, 2010), adopted by 4:10CR3088,
2010 WL 5422638 (D. Neb. Dec. 23, 2010); Indictment 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), United
States v. Hart, No. 8:10CR60 (D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2010), 2010 WL 6307345; Brief in
Support of Motion for Variance from the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v.
Hart, No. 10CR03088 (D. Neb. Apr. 28, 2011), 2011 WL 7327472 [hereinafter Brief in
Support of Motion for Variance]. After Hart’s parole, he was alternately either
homeless or incarcerated and suffered from drug use, a bipolar condition, and
depression. Brief in Support of Motion for Variance. Brief in Support of Motion for
Variance, supra. On July 10, 2010, Hart finished serving a prison term for a prior
parole violation, and was released from prison. Id. The following day, Hart boarded
a bus and came to McCook, Nebraska, where three of his siblings were living. Id.
The U.S. Marshal Service in Lincoln, Nebraska, was soon contacted by the U.S.
Marshal Service in Fresno, California, and was told that Hart had an outstanding
parole violation warrant for failing to register as a sex offender in California. Motion
to Suppress Statements and Request for Evidentiary Hearing and Oral Argument,
United States v. Hart, No. 10CR03088 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2010), 2010 WL 6307346, at
*1 . Hart was subsequently arrested. Id.
6. Hart, 2010 WL 5422900, at *1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Thirty minutes after questioning Hart about his failure to register
in Nebraska, the same group of police officers resumed their
interrogation.11 First, the police officers asked Hart if he would
answer a few questions, which he agreed to do, and then presented
Hart with a Miranda waiver, which he signed.12 Next, the police asked
Hart how long he had lived in Nebraska and if he had registered as a
sex offender in Nebraska.13 Hart repeated his earlier statement,
stating he had lived in Nebraska for about a month and had not
registered as a sex offender.14 The District Court denied Hart’s
motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements, reasoning that the
police did not use a question-first procedure calculated to elicit a
post-Miranda confession from him.15
The admissibility of post-Miranda statements in question-first cases
is governed by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Missouri v. Seibert.16 This Note considers the treatment of midinterrogation Miranda warning cases by the Federal Courts of
Appeals in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s plurality
opinion in Seibert17 and suggests how greater consistency, efficiency,
and fidelity to the law might be achieved in future cases. The Court
described the question-first procedure as a “technique of withholding
warnings until after interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession,”
which causes the subsequent Miranda “warnings [to] be ineffective in
preparing the suspect for successive interrogation, close in time and
similar in content.”18 When the warnings following an earlier
unwarned statement are held ineffective, a statement or confession
offered after that warning is inadmissible.19 In Seibert, the Court
issued a plurality opinion to which four Justices joined. Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence provided the deciding fifth vote.20 The five
Justices disagreed, however, as to how effectiveness should be
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *5–6.
542 U.S. 600, 611–14 (2004).

Id. at 604–22.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Under Seibert, every violation of
Miranda does not require suppression of the evidence obtained. Id. at 618–19.
Rather, “[e]vidence is admissible when the central concerns of Miranda are not likely
to be implicated and when other objectives of the criminal justice system are
furthered by its introduction.” Id. at 618–19.
20. Id. at 618–21.

RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INTERROGATION FIRST

6/26/2013 8:39 PM

1095

determined.21 In Seibert, the plurality uses a multifactor test to
determine whether a suspect’s apprehension of the Miranda warning
was rendered ineffective by the interrogator’s use of a question-first
procedure.22 In contrast, Justice Kennedy articulates a “narrower
test” that applies only to deliberate question-first procedures.23
Further, while the Seibert plurality places the burden of showing
admissibility on the prosecution,24 Justice Kennedy’s opinion is silent
on the matter.25 Thus circuit courts in the wake of Seibert have
disagreed as to whether the intent of the police responsible for the
question-first procedure or the impact on the defendant of a police
question-first procedure controls.26
The conflict among circuit courts in question-first cases stems from
various disagreements. Circuits disagree as to whether the plurality
or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provides the narrowest grounds of
the Supreme Court’s decision, and thus which opinion states the
controlling rule.27 Moreover, the choice of factors determining
whether the use of the mid-interrogation warning was “deliberate” in
a particular case, in addition to their proper application, has been
fraught with conflict.28 Lower courts also misconstrue the various
policies underlying Miranda, such as dispelling the inherently
coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations,29 deterring improper
police conduct, and preserving the trustworthiness of confessions.30
This Note seeks to clarify the complexity of Seibert and explain the
failure of lower courts to accurately apply its precepts. It goes on to
suggest a solution to this problem that reflects the wisdom of Justice
Kennedy’s view.
Part I of this Note discusses the development of the Supreme
Court’s question-first procedure jurisprudence, including a discussion
21. Id. at 622.
22. Id. at 611–14 (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 609 n.1 (plurality opinion) (The burden of showing admissibility rests, of
course, on the prosecution” (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975))).
The plurality in Seibert also places the burden of proving the effectiveness of the
Miranda waiver at a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
25. Id. at 618–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d
470, 478 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 n.11 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2008).
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Parts Part II.B, II.C.
29. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308–09 (1985).
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of question-first procedures generally; the development of the
Miranda warning; the facts in Seibert that led to the Supreme Court’s
focus on the question-first procedure; and the Supreme Court’s
treatment of Miranda violations through question-first procedures.
Part II analyzes ten circuit courts’ applications of Seibert in light of
the considerations and analysis applied by Justice Kennedy in his
concurrence, as well as the burden of proof required of the
prosecution, if any, to show that police did not apply a deliberate twostep interrogation technique. Throughout this analysis, this Note
examines the facts present in the circuit cases as they relate to those
in Seibert.
Lastly, Part III argues that Justice Kennedy’s approach, which is
followed by the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits, should be controlling. Second, within the set of circuits
following Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, this Note supports an
approach followed only by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as
particularly faithful to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, even though
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence does not explicitly advance any
factors.31 Third, this Note seeks to clarify the proper application of
the factors to be used by lower courts to comply with Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence.32 Finally, this Note attempts to bring order
to the inconsistent and inefficient jurisprudence surrounding
evaluations of potentially improper question-first procedures.33 In the
aftermath of Seibert, circuit courts have used widely divergent and
inconsistent criteria to evaluate whether a particular question-first
procedure violates Miranda. The criteria used by circuit courts often
contradict the central concerns and considerations advanced by
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Moreover, the inconsistency in the
circuit courts’ treatment of question-first cases provides poor
guidance to police and sows confusion in the lower courts. This Note
suggests a simple and more coherent standard in accordance with
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.

31. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004).
32. See id. For example, circuit courts have also incorrectly approached the issues
of whether a burden of proving a deliberate violation of Miranda should exist and
whether the suspect or law enforcement must bear such a burden. See infra Part
III.C.vi.
33. See infra Part III.
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF QUESTION-FIRST
JURISPRUDENCE
To provide context to the standards applied by courts in questionfirst cases, I provide a brief overview of the development of Supreme
Court case law regarding custodial interrogations and Miranda
warnings. I then discuss the circumstances in Seibert, which led to the
apparently deliberate two-step interrogation of the defendant.34
A. The Right Against Self-Incrimination and Miranda v.

Arizona
Prior to Miranda, courts evaluated the admissibility of confessions
under a voluntariness test, which the Supreme Court developed from
the Fifth Amendment35 and the Fourteenth Amendment36 to the
United States Constitution.37 In Haynes v. Washington, the Supreme
Court held that a suspect’s custodial statements were involuntary
where they had been obtained by “techniques and methods offensive
to due process” or under circumstances precluding a suspect from
exercising “a free and unconstrained will.”38 In 1966, however, the
Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona that statements made by a
defendant while under custodial interrogation may not be used
against him at trial, unless the prosecution proved that law
enforcement took certain procedural steps to protect the defendant’s
constitutional right against self-incrimination.39 Specifically, the
Court in Miranda required law enforcement to advise custodial
suspects of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel
before and during interrogation.40 In response, Congress attempted
to overrule Miranda by passing 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).41

34. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
37. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); see also Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227 (1940).
38. 373 U.S. at 514–15.
39. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
40. Id. at 467–70.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 reads, in relevant part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given. . . . (b) The trial judge in determining the issue of
voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding
the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest
and arraignment of the defendant . . . (2) whether such defendant knew the

RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1098

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

6/26/2013 8:39 PM

[Vol. XL

Subsequently, in United States v. Dickerson, the Supreme Court
examined 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Miranda opinion to determine
whether the Miranda court had announced a constitutional rule.42
The Court held that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that
replaced the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness
test,43 and invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 3501, reasoning that the statute
must be invalid if Miranda continues to be the law.44 Given the
Court’s reaffirmation of Miranda in Dickerson, the admissibility of
statements made by a suspect during interrogation remains
dependent upon the provision of Miranda warnings by police.45
B.

Oregon v. Elstad

The Supreme Court first addressed the question-first procedure in

Oregon v. Elstad.46 In Elstad, a police officer visited the home of an
eighteen-year-old male suspect in a burglary.47 Without giving
Miranda warnings, the officer asked whether the young man knew
another man implicated in the robbery.48 After the suspect replied in
the affirmative, the police officer informed the suspect that he
believed the suspect was involved in the robbery, to which the suspect

nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was
suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such
defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any
statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4)
whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his
right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was
without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such
confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of
voluntariness of the confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968), invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000).
42. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437.
43. Id. at 438–43 (holding that Miranda and its progeny govern the admissibility
of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts).
44. Id. at 432 (finding Miranda to be a constitutional decision of the Court, which
may not be overruled by an Act of Congress).
45. Id. at 444; see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (finding that
by adequately and effectively apprising a suspect that his rights and the exercise of
those rights must be fully honored, Miranda “reduce[s] the risk of a coerced
confession and [] implement[s] the Self–Incrimination Clause” (quoting Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
47. Id. at 300–01.
48. Id. at 301.
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again replied in the affirmative.49 The police subsequently drove the
suspect to the police station, gave him a full set of warnings and
elicited another confession, consistent with the first admission.50
To determine whether the subsequent warned confession should be
inadmissible at trial, the Elstad Court determined that “[t]he relevant
inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily
made.”51 Specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that the officer’s
unwarned interrogation of the suspect was an oversight, and therefore
“had none of the earmarks of coercion.”52 This directly contradicted
the Oregon State Supreme Court’s position that, since the unwarned
statement to the officer took place during a series of questions, the
“cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive impact on [the
defendant’s] later admissions,” rendering them inadmissible.53 In
response, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that
“[a]bsent deliberate coercion or improper tactics in obtaining an
unwarned statement, a careful and thorough administration of
Miranda warnings cures the condition that rendered the unwarned
statement inadmissible.”54 As a result, the Supreme Court reversed
the Oregon State Supreme Court’s decision to suppress the suspect’s
later warned confession, despite the fact that the suspect’s first
admission was unwarned and the interrogation had proceeded in two
steps, with an unwarned confession at the first step and a subsequent
Mirandized confession at the second step.
The difference between the determination of the Oregon Supreme
Court and that of the United States Supreme Court in Elstad lies in
the different perspective each side takes to evaluate whether the
police conducted a deliberately coercive question-first procedure.
While the Oregon court focuses on the coercive effect of the prior
unwarned confession on later admissions, the Supreme Court
disregards this consideration and instead focuses exclusively on
whether the police officers’ execution of the unwarned and
subsequent warned interrogations of a suspect were “deliberately
coercive.”55
49. Id.
50. Id. at 301–02.
51. Id. at 318.
52. Id. at 316
53. Id. at 303 (quoting State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552, 555 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)).
54. Id. at 299.
55. Id. at 314 (“[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the
initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does
not warrant a presumption of compulsion.”).

RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

1100

C.

6/26/2013 8:39 PM

[Vol. XL

Missouri v. Seibert

In Seibert, a defendant was suspected of involvement in the
burning of a mobile home to conceal the circumstances of her son’s
death in his sleep.56 Police arrested the defendant but failed to
administer her Miranda warnings and questioned her for over half an
hour, which resulted in the suspect’s confession that her son was
actually supposed to die in the fire.57 Police then gave the defendant a
twenty-minute break, returned to administer her Miranda warnings,
and obtained a waiver.58
The interrogating officer then resumed questioning the suspect,
confronting her with her pre-Miranda statements and getting her to
repeat the information she had revealed earlier.59 At trial, the officer
testified that he made a conscious decision to withhold Miranda
warnings, question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the
question until he got the answer previously given, pursuant to an
interrogation technique the officer was taught.60 Because the Court
held that the Miranda warnings, which were given mid-interrogation
after the defendant provided an unwarned confession, were
ineffective, the suspect’s subsequent repeated confession was
inadmissible at trial.61

1.

Description of Question-First Technique

The Court described the question-first procedure as a police
practice in custodial interrogations that calls for giving no warnings of
the rights to silence and counsel until interrogation has produced an
incriminating statement.62 Though such a statement is generally
inadmissible as it results from a violation of Miranda,63 the
interrogating officer follows the statement with Miranda warnings
and then leads the suspect to cover the same ground a second time.64
Because this question-first procedure does not effectively comply
with Miranda’s constitutional requirement,65 the Supreme Court held
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004).

Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id. at 605–06.
Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966).

Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604.
See id. at 609.
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that a statement repeated after a warning in such circumstances is
inadmissible.66 In Seibert, the Court stated that the technique of
interrogating in successive, unwarned and warned phases raised a new
challenge to Miranda.67 At the time of Seibert, the question-first
procedure was widespread, having been included in police training
nationwide.68 Though the question-first procedure’s prevalence in
police training has decreased nationwide post-Seibert,69 police
training advocacy of the procedure has not ceased entirely.70
The question-first procedure undermines the effectiveness of the
eventual Miranda warning because a suspect cannot understand
initially that she has a right against self-incrimination once a she has
already incriminated herself during the pre-Miranda stage.71 Further,
it is unlikely that a suspect can retain the understanding that Miranda
provides when the interrogator leads the suspect through her
previous unprotected statements.72 Finally, it is unlikely that a
suspect will understand that she has the right to stop the

66. Id. at 604; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before Miranda
Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the
Most Critical Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1239, 1269 (2007).
67. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 609.
68. Id. at 609–11; see also Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for A Lie: False Confessions
and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques,
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 800 n.59 (2006).
69. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1553–54
(2008).
70. Id. This commentator provides evidence that formal training dissuading
police from providing Miranda warnings has occurred since Seibert:
If the truth is that custodial interrogation without Miranda waivers does
not violate the Constitution, does not violate the Miranda evidentiary rule,
and does not constitute deterrable misconduct, any statements thus
obtained have legitimate investigative and evidentiary uses:
- Neutralize safety threats . . .
- Locate weapons and evidence . . .
- Identify witnesses . . .
- Incriminate accomplices . . .
- PC for search warrant . . .
- PC for arrest . . .
- Impeach inconsistent trial testimony . . .
Might knowledge of the truth about Miranda sometimes cause an
interrogating officer to conclude that s/he might have something to gain
through custodial interrogation without waivers?
Id. (quoting L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, SECRET PASSAGES, THE TRUTH
ABOUT MIRANDA 10–12 (2005)).
71. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613 n.5.
72. Id.

RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

6/26/2013 8:39 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

1102

interrogation, since she
incriminating statements.73

2.

has

already

provided

[Vol. XL
unprotected

Seibert Question-First Analysis

The Supreme Court’s majority decision in Seibert to exclude the
suspect’s confession was formed from a plurality, comprised of
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,74 and a concurrence
by Justice Kennedy.75 Rather than focus on the intent of the police
officer that executed the question-first procedure, the plurality held
“that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would not have
understood them to convey a message that she retained a choice
about continuing to talk.”76
To decide whether the defendant’s warned confession in Seibert
should be suppressed, the plurality in Seibert
laid out five factors to be weighed when analyzing the effectiveness
of the warning: (1) “the completeness and detail of the questions
and answers in the first round of interrogation,” (2) “the
overlapping content of the two statements,” (3) “the timing and
setting of the first and second” interrogation, (4) “the continuity of
police personnel,” and (5) “the degree to which the interrogator’s
questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.”77

Toward the end of the plurality’s opinion, the plurality applied this
standard to the facts, which, it argued, collectively undermined the
Miranda protection. Significantly, the plurality equivocated with
respect to whether this standard should be evaluated in terms of its
police tactics or creating a coercive impact from the perspective of the
suspect.78 First, the initial unwarned interrogation was described as
“systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill,”
leaving “little, if anything, of incriminating potential left unsaid.”79
This satisfied the plurality’s first factor, which evaluated the
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first

73. Id.
74. Justice Breyer joined in the plurality opinion fully, but also filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 617–18 (Breyer, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 617–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Id. (plurality opinion).
77. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Seibert, 542
U.S. at 615).
78. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616–17.
79. Id. at 616.
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round of interrogation.80 Second, because Seibert repeated her
statements almost verbatim during both the unwarned and warned
confessions, the content of the two statements clearly overlapped,
thereby satisfying the second factor.81 Third, the plurality described
the warned phase of questioning as proceeding after a pause of only
fifteen to twenty minutes, in the same place as the unwarned
segment.82 The short time between both interrogations and the fact
that each of the interrogations took place in the station house fulfilled
the timing and setting factor of the plurality approach.83
Fourth, the same officer who had conducted the first phase recited
the Miranda warnings, thereby continuing the police presence of the
pre-Miranda questioning into the post-Miranda stage. Fifth, the
interrogating officers referenced the suspect’s pre-Miranda statement
during the post-Miranda stage when she made a statement at odds
with her unwarned confession.84 Additionally, the interrogating
officer said nothing to counter the probable misimpression arising
from the warning that anything Seibert said could be used against her,
nor did the officer actually advise Seibert that her prior confession
could not be used against her.85 This demonstrated the degree to
which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as
continuous with the first, satisfying the fifth factor.86 Lastly, the
plurality did not undertake any curative measures analysis.87
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion differs in certain key respects
from the plurality opinion. Specifically, Justice Kennedy argues that
statements obtained from police use of a question-first procedure
should only be suppressed where the police conducted the questionfirst procedure deliberately. Justice Kennedy’s approach narrows the
plurality’s approach in holding that the plurality’s test
envisions an objective inquiry from the perspective of the suspect,
and applies in the case of both intentional and unintentional two-

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 605 (noting police testimony stating “Trice, didn’t you tell me that he
was supposed to die in his sleep?” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985) (finding that interrogating officers did not use the
suspect’s pre-Miranda statements to pressure the suspect into waiving the right to
remain silent).
85. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616.
86. Id. at 616–17.
87. Id.
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stage interrogations. In my view, this test cuts too broadly. . . . I
would apply a narrower test applicable only in the infrequent case,
such as we have here, in which the two-step interrogation technique
was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.88

Additionally, according to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, if a
court finds that the police executed a deliberate two-step
interrogation, the court must also evaluate whether any curative
measures took place afterwards to render the suspect’s confession
admissible.89 These curative measures include allowing time to pass
between interrogations, changing personnel, and changing location.
The five-Justice majority held that post-Miranda statements,
subsequent to a pre-Miranda interrogation, were inadmissible where
mid-interrogation Miranda warnings were ineffective.90
Unlike
Justice Kennedy, the plurality did not address curative measures as a
separate step. Additionally, the plurality was unclear as to whether
effectiveness should be determined by the intent of the police
responsible for the question-first procedure or the impact on the
defendant of the question-first procedure.91
Notably, Justice Kennedy shifts to addressing the impact on the
defendant of the question-first procedure when evaluating curative
measures, which he argues “should be designed to ensure that a
reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would understand the
import and effect of the Miranda warning and . . . waiver.”92 Indeed, a
key difference between the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy lies
in the focus of each. In Seibert, the plurality resurrected the Oregon
State Supreme Court’s focus in Elstad on an unwarned confession’s
impact on a suspect to determine whether an improper question-first
procedure occurred.93 This focus on the defendant, however, was too
“broad” for Justice Kennedy, who was concerned that punishing
unintentional failures to initially provide Miranda would fail to deter
improper police conduct.94 Thus, in contrast to the four-Justice
plurality’s approach, Justice Kennedy concluded that the statements

88. Id. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 622.
90. Id. at 616 (plurality opinion).
91. See generally id. at 600; see also infra Part III.A.
92. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. See id. at 617 (plurality opinion) (“These circumstances must be seen as
challenging the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point
that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would not have understood them to
convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk.”).
94. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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repeated after later warnings would not be admissible if a deliberate
question-first procedure was employed, where the administration of
Miranda warnings occurred after a prior unwarned confession.95
Additionally, Justice Kennedy held that upon use of a question-first
procedure with the intention of violating Miranda during an extended
interview, post-Miranda statements that are related to the substance
of pre-Miranda statements must be excluded unless police take
specific, curative steps to reestablish the effectiveness of the Miranda
warning.96 In Seibert, Justice Kennedy found that the police executed
a deliberate question-first procedure and failed to take curative
measures to render the Miranda warning effective.97 As a result, the
Court excluded the suspect’s post-Miranda statements.
Part II will examine the approaches of circuit courts that seek to
follow either the Seibert plurality or Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion and, among those circuits that follow Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, Part II will examine their approaches to the
considerations that Justice Kennedy applied.
II. CONFLICT OVER THE PROPER APPLICATION OF MISSOURI V.

SEIBERT
The circuit courts have different approaches to evaluating whether
police employed a question-first strategy. Six circuits follow Justice
Kennedy’s view and ask whether the violation was deliberate. The
remaining circuits either apply the plurality alone or use both tests
concurrently, or combine parts of the two, and usually decline to
decide which approach controls.98 In either case, the circuits usually
decline to decide which approach controls.99
This circuit split results in inconsistent suppression holdings in
question-first cases, unpredictable law, and unclear guidance to law

95. Id.
96. Justice Kennedy held in Seibert that if “deliberate, two-step strateg[ies],
predicated upon violating Miranda during an extended interview” were used, the
Court must determine whether “specific, curative steps” were taken to obviate the
violation that occurred. Id. at 621.
97. Id. at 622.
98. Thompson v. Runnels, 657 F.3d 784, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Verdugo, 617
F.3d 565, 575 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d at 879, 885–86 (7th Cir.
2009); United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2008). But see United
States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521, 524–25 (7th Cir. 2011).
99. See United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n.11 (6th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).
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enforcement personnel. This Part illustrates the circuit split by first
examining the two-pronged approach of circuit courts that apply both
the plurality approach and Justice Kennedy’s professedly narrower
inquiry into whether the question-first procedure was deliberately
executed by police, then by examining the more common approach of
the circuit courts that follow Justice Kennedy’s narrower inquiry
exclusively.
The circuit courts also have three different approaches to applying
Justice Kennedy’s inquiry into whether a question-first procedure was
deliberately executed.100 Finally, this Part examines the circuits’
varying treatment of the considerations and criteria used by the lower
courts to evaluate the deliberateness of question-first procedures.
The approaches of the circuit courts that follow the plurality and
those that follow Justice Kennedy’s concurrence each have their
strengths and weaknesses.101 Similarly, the approaches of the circuit
courts to the factors comprising Justice Kennedy’s approach and
other considerations involved in question-first cases also have
strengths and weaknesses.102 Subsequently, Part II reviews praise and
criticism of these approaches through the combined lenses of the
policies underlying Miranda and the principle of stare decisis.103
A. Plurality v. Intent

1.

Circuits that Apply the Plurality Approach to Evaluate
Question-First Procedures

Five circuits apply either solely the plurality approach or
concurrently apply both the plurality and Justice Kennedy’s
deliberateness test to question-first procedures. Specifically, the First
Circuit,104 Sixth Circuit,105 Seventh Circuit,106 Ninth Circuit,107 and

100. Differences arise in Justice Kennedy’s view when it is considered alone and
when the plurality is also considered. Although the plurality also varies somewhat in
application across the circuits, these differences are less pronounced and are not
examined here.
101. See infra Part II.A.
102. See infra Part II.B.
103. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 619–20 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Oregon v. Elstad, 614
U.S. 298, 308 (1995) (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974)).
104. United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 575 (1st Cir. 2010) (declining to
determine whether Seibert’s reach is limited to cases in which the police set out to
subvert a suspect’s Miranda rights because the post-Miranda statement at issue was
admissible even under the Seibert plurality’s more context-sensitive test); see also
United States v. Jackson, 608 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2010).
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105. United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2008) (applied both
Justice Kennedy’s test and the plurality’s test). But see United States v. Flack, No.
3:08-CR-108, 2009 WL 5031320 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 2009).
106. In the wake of Seibert, the Seventh Circuit has applied both a combination of
the intent-focused approach and the plurality’s approach. In United States v. Heron,
the Seventh Circuit indicated that Seibert focused on the effectiveness of Miranda
warnings, while applying both an “intent-based test” and a “defendant focused” test.
564 F.3d 879, 885–86 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079,
1090 (7th Cir. 2004) (indicating that “at least as to deliberate two-step interrogations
in which Miranda warnings are intentionally withheld until after the suspect
confesses, the central voluntariness inquiry . . . has been replaced by a presumptive
rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test for change in time, place, and
circumstances from the first statement to the second,” and further indicating that
Seibert might not control “[w]here the initial violation of Miranda was not part of a
deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings”). In cases that have been decided
subsequent to Heron, the Seventh Circuit has adopted an intent-based approach to
address two-step interrogations, which favors Elstad’s voluntariness inquiry over
Seibert’s effectiveness inquiry. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318; see also United States v.
Hernandez, No. 11-CR-360, 2012 WL 601869, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2012). Note
that an important rationale undergirding the Seventh Circuit’s approach to questionfirst procedures is Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Seibert, which argues that Justice
Kennedy’s focus is on intent. Specifically, Justice Breyer held that the intent of law
enforcement to conduct a question-first procedure determined whether a suspect’s
post-Miranda confession was voluntary, as opposed to whether the Miranda warning
was effective. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617-18 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit has appeared to adopt Justice Kennedy’s intentbased inquiry in Seibert, but applied it to Elstad’s inquiry into whether a suspect’s
post-Miranda confession was voluntary. This Note, however, does not endorse this
approach, as it does not deter improper police conduct because, like the plurality
approach in Seibert, it is defendant-focused. The Seventh Circuit’s approach is novel,
given its efficient merging of Seibert into the effectiveness of Miranda and Elstad’s
inquiry into the voluntariness of a suspect’s post-Miranda confession. However, this
Note does not favor this approach, as it does not deter improper police conduct, since
like the plurality it is defendant-focused, and because it does not address which
criteria should be used by courts to determine whether a question-first procedure was
deliberate. Though the Seventh Circuit steadfastly applied the plurality’s and Justice
Kennedy’s tests, respectively, for over five years, in recent years, the Seventh Circuit
has appeared to move towards the latter intent-based approach. See United States v.
Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521,
524–25 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Littledale, 652 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995, 1004 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v.
Pettigrew, 455 F.3d 1164 (10th Circ. 2006). The Seventh Circuit’s use of the intentbased approach to determine the voluntariness of a suspect’s post-Miranda
statements, however, is a significant change from Seibert’s inquiry into the
effectiveness of the Miranda warning (subsequent to a prior pre-Miranda statement).
For example, in United States v. Swanson, the Seventh Circuit demonstrated its use
of the intent-based approach to determine the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession
rather than the effectiveness of the Miranda warning. 635 F.3d at 1004. In particular,
the Court reasoned that the suspect’s initial statements were involuntary because
police conducted a deliberate question-first procedure, and because subsequent
curative measures, such as “the time that passes between confessions, the change in
place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators[,]” did not
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Tenth Circuit108 apply either the plurality or Justice Kennedy’s
approach, or both, usually because both tests yield the same result.109
To discern the correct Seibert holding, most circuit courts follow the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Marks, holding that
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.110

Some courts applying the Marks rule, however, disregard the focus
on police intent in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence because seven
other Justices rejected intent as grounds for determining whether an
illegal question-first procedure has occurred.111
insulate the suspect’s subsequent post-Miranda statements from the “taint” of the
prior involuntary statement. Id. (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310, 314); see also Stewart,
388 F.3d at 1089 (“[T]ruly ‘effective’ Miranda warnings . . . will occur only when
certain circumstances—a lapse in time, a change in location or interrogating officer,
or a shift in the focus of the questioning—intervene between the unwarned
questioning and any postwarning statement.” (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618
(Breyer, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
107. Thompson v. Runnels, 657 F.3d 784, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the
plurality and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence must be “read together”); cf. United
States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[B]oth the plurality and
Justice Kennedy agree that where law enforcement officers deliberately employ a
two-step interrogation to obtain a confession and where separations of time and
circumstance and additional curative warnings are absent or fail to apprise a
reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes of his rights, the trial court should suppress
the confession. This narrower test—that excludes confessions made after a
deliberate, objectively ineffective mid-stream warning—represents Seibert’s
holding.”).
108. United States v. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58, 72 (10th Cir. 2011)
(finding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the narrowest grounds for the
Supreme Court’s decision to suppress).
109. United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n.11 (6th Cir. 2008)
(declining to resolve the issue because the statement would be suppressed under any
applicable framework); United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th
Cir. 2006) (holding there was no need to decide because statement is admissible
under either test); see also Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 848 (D.C. 2007)
(“[T]here is some disagreement concerning the precise analysis that Seibert mandates
. . . [but] the statements in this case should have been suppressed under either
standard.”).
110. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
111. See United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 2009) (arguing that
Justice Kennedy’s intent-based test in Seibert was not the narrowest approach “that
Marks was talking about” because only Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer
supported an intent-based test to evaluate question-first procedures”); United States
v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1133–48 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is not narrower and therefore does not
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Intra-circuit splits between whether to apply the plurality approach
or Justice Kennedy’s approach have also plagued question-first
jurisprudence.112 The Sixth Circuit, for example, held in United States
v. Pacheco-Lopez that application of the plurality’s test was sufficient,
stating that “[r]esolution of whether the police purposefully sought to
evade Miranda is unnecessary, as Lopez’s statements are inadmissible
even if the police didn’t purposefully implement a question first-warn
later strategy.”113 In United States v. McConer, however, a questionfirst decision filed only one day later, the Sixth Circuit held that
“neither the plurality nor the concurrence in Seibert” demonstrated
that police deliberately administered a question-first procedure to
McConer.114 In arriving at its decision, the Court emphasized that
“Justice Kennedy’s narrower concurrence . . . provided the fifth vote
to find a Miranda violation in Seibert.”115
Intra-state splits also exist.116 In United States v. Hairston, the D.C.
Court of Appeals discussed both the plurality approach and Justice
Kennedy’s approach, and attempted to determine whether the police
had conducted a question-first procedure by applying the plurality’s
test.117 In contrast, in Edwards v. United States, the D.C. Court of
Appeals applied both approaches, reasoning that since “some
disagreement concerning the precise analysis that Seibert mandates”
and “the statements in this case should have been suppressed under

represent the holding of the Court); see also Eric English, You Have the Right to
Remain Silent. Now Please Repeat Your Confession: Missouri v. Seibert and the
Court’s Attempt to Put an End to the Question-First Technique, 33 PEPP. L. REV.
423, 462 (2006); cf. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x at 72 n.1 (collecting cases in
support of the view that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence constituted the narrowest
common ground of the Seibert majority).
112. See Heron, 564 F.3d at 885 (arguing that the Seibert plurality’s defendantfocused approach is the correct method); cf. United States v. Hernandez, No. 11 CR
360, 2012 WL 601869, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2012) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has
adopted an intent-based approach to addressing two-step interrogations.” (citing
United States v. Littledale, 652 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Swanson, 635 F.3d 985, 1004 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943
(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521, 524-25 (7th Cir. 2011)).
113. See Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d at 432 n.10.
114. United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2008).
115. Id. at 498; see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
116. See Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765, 781 (D.C. 2006) (focusing
exclusively on the five factor test applied by the Seibert plurality to determine
whether the Miranda warnings were effective); cf. Edwards 923 A.2d at 848 (asking
whether police deliberately used a question-first procedure).
117. Hairston, 905 A.2d at 781.
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either standard, we need not determine the precise analysis that
follows from the opinions in Seibert.”118
Significantly, circuit cases have demonstrated that the choice
between the plurality and Justice Kennedy’s approach can yield
opposite results.119 Indeed, in United States v. Sanchez-Gallego, the
Court contrasted the analysis present in the plurality approach with
Justice Kennedy’s approach, and decided that “that the conclusion
might be different under the plurality’s test in Seibert.”120 Further, in
United States v. Zubiate, the Court found that the conduct of United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, who
interrogated a suspect for fifteen minutes before providing the
warnings, would not satisfy the plurality test but that the statement
would satisfy Justice Kennedy’s because the conduct was not
“calculated.”121 The cumulative effect of such divergent outcomes
sows confusion both among police officer and the lower courts.

2.

Circuits that Solely Apply Justice Kennedy’s Deliberateness Test
to the Question-First Procedure Inquiry

Six circuits solely follow Justice Kennedy’s view and ask whether
the question-first procedure was a deliberate violation of Miranda.
Specifically, the Second Circuit,122 Third Circuit,123 Fourth Circuit,124
Fifth Circuit,125 Eighth Circuit,126 and Eleventh Circuit127 conduct this

118. Edwards, 923 A.2d at 848.
119. United States v. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58, 73 (10th Cir. 2011)
(Ebels, J., concurring); see also Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d at 426–30; United States v.
Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151–53 (10th Cir. 2006); accord. People v. Lucas,
232 P.3d 195 (Colo. App. 2009); Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling
(with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 48 (2010) (arguing
that cases in which the police were not acting in bad faith—as the applying court
understands the concept—yet the suspect was confused nonetheless about the
freedom to stay mum after the Miranda warnings finally were delivered, the suspect
will win under Justice Souter’s test and lose under Justice Kennedy’s test).
120. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x at 73 n.2.
121. No. 08-CR-507 (JG), 2009 WL 483199, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009).
122. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 2010).
123. United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176, 190 (3d Cir. 2008).
124. United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2005).
125. United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in a 5–4 decision, and decided the case on
narrower grounds than the majority.”).
126. United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing United
States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007)) (finding Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence to be controlling because it provided the fifth vote necessary for a
majority and because it was decided on narrower grounds than the plurality opinion).
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inquiry.
Each of these circuits hold that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence is controlling because it represents the narrowest
grounds of the Seibert majority. These circuits argue that the test
stated in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is the narrowest
grounds because it applies the Supreme Court’s “effectiveness”
inquiry only to deliberate execution of the question-first procedure.128

3.

Criticism and Justification of the Plurality Approach Versus
Justice Kennedy’s Approach

Policy considerations and adherence to stare decisis play a critical
role in the criticism and justification of circuit courts’ decisions to use
solely Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. A critic writes that Justice
Kennedy’s approach cannot deter deliberate execution of the
question-first procedure because judges forced to apply a subjective
bad faith Miranda test will make disparate and arbitrary admissibility
decisions.129 An alternate view counters that the plurality’s factors are
no less vague.130 Moreover, one commentator argues that the intent
of the officer is reliably ascertainable because it is a standard

Immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in Seibert, however, the Eighth
Circuit applied only the plurality approach. See United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d
520 (8th Cir. 2004).
127. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because Seibert
is a plurality decision and Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the narrowest
grounds, it is his concurring opinion that provides the controlling law.” (citing United
States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1136 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006)).
128. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 2010) (Trager, J.
dissenting); see also United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Although the plurality would consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a
Seibert inquiry, Justice Kennedy’s opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those
cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miranda’s
protections.”); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532–33 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying
Justice Kennedy’s test in finding that law enforcement officials had not performed a
deliberate two-step interrogation); Mashburn, 406 F.3d at 308–09 (“In Seibert, Justice
Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court on the narrowest grounds.”);
United States v. Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 2004) (arguing that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion was “of special significance” because he relied on grounds
narrower than those of the plurality).
129. Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v.
Seibert Police “Bad Faith” Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 398–99
(2005).
130. English, supra note 111, at 464–65; see also infra Part III (arguing that the
multifactor test is supported by the plurality and Justice Kennedy and that the chief
difference between the two lies in whether the inquiry focuses on the intent of the
police or the suspect’s understanding of his right against self-incrimination).
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inference in evidence that intent may be inferred from actions.131
Additionally, in United States v. Capers, the Second Circuit justified
the requirement that police prove that a question-first procedure was
not deliberate by reasoning that Miranda is an exclusionary rule
“aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and prosecution.”132
Another view argues that only an intent-based approach is suited to
evaluate an inherently coercive question-first tactic.133
Addressing trustworthiness, a commentator observed that the postMiranda statements would be in danger of being compromised if
subject to the potentially coercive pressures of a deliberate questionfirst procedure.134
Another commentator argued that Justice
Kennedy’s reasoning would apply to any confession, since deliberate
execution of the question-first procedure can still yield trustworthy
statements, and that is distinctly not what Miranda held.135 Justice
O’Connor, in her dissenting opinion, similarly reasoned that a suspect
who experienced the exact same interrogation as Seibert, but where
the question-first procedure was not deliberate, would not have any
corresponding change in the trustworthiness of his statements.136
Justice O’Connor also argued that intent was impossible to discern.137
Additionally, at least one critic has suggested that an intent-based
approach will perversely incentivize covert execution of question-first
procedures, which will be difficult to reveal.138 Another commentator,
however, argued that it is a standard inference in evidence that courts
may infer intent from actions.139
Interpretation of the Seibert opinions is also crucial to determining
which opinion is controlling. Many courts justify choosing Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion as the narrowest ground of Seibert’s
fragmented majority, because Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
holds that cases where a question-first procedure took place should
be reviewed for the effectiveness of the Miranda warning only where

131. Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Breaching the Citadel: Willful Violations of
Miranda After Missouri v. Seibert, 10 APPALACHIAN J.L. 91, 96–97 (2011).
132. Capers, 627 F.3d at 480.
133. See generally English, supra note 111, at 454–55.
134. Paul G. Alvarez, Taking Back Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Can Keep
“Question-First” and “Outside Miranda” Interrogation Tactics in Check, 54 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1195, 1233 n.95 (2005).
135. Friedman, supra note 119, at 23.
136. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 623 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 626.
138. Fan, supra note 1, at 1437–38.
139. Sanders, supra note 131.
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the interrogator deliberately used a two-step technique to circumvent
Miranda.140 In contrast, other courts criticize this approach. In
United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, the Tenth Circuit argued that
Justice Kennedy’s proposed holding in his concurrence was rejected
by a majority of the Seibert Court.141 In United States v. RodriguezPreciado, a dissenting Ninth Circuit judge explained, “three of the
four Justices in the plurality and the four dissenters decisively
rejected any subjective [test] . . . based on deliberateness on the part
of the police.”142 Moreover, the D.C. Court of Appeals argued in
Edwards that although Justice Kennedy’s test appears narrower
because it only applies to the deliberate use of a two-step procedure,
within that subset of cases, it is broader because Justice Kennedy’s
approach would suppress even if a court determined that the Miranda
warnings could function effectively.143 As a result, the D.C. Court of
Appeals argues, more statements might be admitted that result from
question-first procedures because the plurality’s approach only
excludes confessions resulting from effective warnings, regardless of
the intent of the interrogating officers, whereas Justice Kennedy’s
approach reaches all intentional applications of the question-first
procedure.144
The following sections of Part II illustrate both the factors and
considerations that the circuit courts use to determine whether
instances of question-first interrogation by police were deliberate.
B.

Three Circuit Court Approaches to Applying Justice
Kennedy’s Concurrence

Circuit courts take three general approaches to evaluating whether
police deliberately executed a question-first procedure. In the first
approach, circuits argue that Justice Kennedy’s deliberateness
standard lacks explicit factors to consider because the record was
clear in Seibert that the interrogating officers deliberately executed a

140. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 2010) (Trager, J.,
dissenting).
141. See United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006).
142. United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1138–41 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Berzon, J., dissenting in part); see also United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884
(7th Cir. 2009) (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence did not constitute the
narrowest approach because seven of nine justices rejected an intent-based
approach).
143. Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 848 n.10 (D.C. 2007).
144. Id.
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question-first procedure.145 Circuits using this ad-hoc approach often
cherry-pick factors from the plurality or underscore various facts or
considerations to justify their evaluations of deliberateness.146
In the second approach, courts use the factors stated by the
plurality, regardless of whether the failure to administer Miranda
warnings during the initial interrogation was deliberate or not,
reasoning that “Justice Kennedy uses the same factors as the
plurality’s approach, but he uses them . . . to determine whether
police officers deliberately [withhold] Miranda warnings.”147 The
application of these factors is still defendant-focused, however, in
contrast to Justice Kennedy’s inquiry solely into the intent of the
interrogating officers.148
In the third approach, circuit courts adhere solely to the factors in
Justice Kennedy’s analysis, as opposed to strict adherence to the
plurality’s factors or an ad hoc inquiry into the totality of the
evidence.149 The third approach also focuses exclusively on the
deliberateness of the police execution of the question-first procedure,
as opposed to the second approach’s defendant-focused
perspective.150 As an example, in Gonzalez-Lauzan, the Eleventh
Circuit examined whether pre-Miranda questioning by police elicited
any incriminating statements, whether the officers did not have prewarned incriminating statements with which to cross-examine
Gonzalez-Lauzan to pressure him to repeat them, and whether
Gonzalez-Lauzan’s post-warning statements related to the substance
of his single, brief pre-warning statement.151
The circuit courts justify the three approaches to the Seibert factors
with respect to the plurality and Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
different ways. For example, in Gonzalez-Lauzan, the Tenth Circuit
prefaced their approach of strict adherence to the factors applied by
Justice Kennedy, simply by stating “the two-step technique employed

145. Capers, 627 F.3d at 477–78 (citing United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148,
1158 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006)) (finding that Justice Kennedy did not articulate how a
court should determine whether an interrogator used a deliberate two-step strategy).
146. See infra Part III for criticism of this approach given its facilitation of biases
for or against law enforcement.
147. United States v. Flack, No. 3:08-CR-108, 2009 WL 5031320, at *19–20 (E.D.
Tenn. Dec. 11, 2009) (emphasis added).
148. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 618.
150. Id. at 620.
151. United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138–39 (11th Cir. 2006);
see also United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2006).
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here is of the type that was the narrow focus of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion.”152 At least one commentator supported this approach,
suggesting that courts could hold that absence of one or more of the
criteria cited by Justice Kennedy is indicative of willfulness.153
In Capers, the Second Circuit examined the totality of the objective
and subjective evidence by applying the five plurality factors and
examining any other evidence available154 before inquiring into
curative measures. The court stated that all available evidence should
be considered when examining whether the officers’ actions indicate a
deliberate question-first procedure. The court reasoned that both the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits used this approach, and noted Justice
Souter’s observation that “‘the intent of the officer will rarely be as
candidly admitted as it was’ in Seibert, where the interrogating officer
testified . . . that he was trained to conduct a question-first
procedure.”155 Finally, courts justify the ad hoc approach by stealth
omission of any discussion of the use of the suspect’s pre-Miranda
statements in the suspect’s subsequent post-Miranda interrogation.156
C. Criteria Used by Circuit Courts to Evaluate Justice
Kennedy’s Factors and Other Considerations Associated with the
Question-First Inquiry
The variance of the preceding circuit approaches results from the
inherent difficulty of proving that police deliberately executed a
question-first procedure. Moreover, question-first cases usually fall
into a grey area between a good-faith failure to administer an earlier
Miranda warning and a deliberate execution of the question-first
procedure. Unlike Seibert, circuit courts rarely encounter questionfirst cases in which police admit to deliberate execution of the
question-first procedure.
At least one circuit, however, has evaluated a failure to administer
Miranda warnings that police admitted were deliberate.157 Such an
152. Gonzales-Lauzan, 437 F.3d at 1139.
153. Sanders, supra note 131, at 97.
154. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 2010).
155. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. This quote from Seibert appears intended to imply
that any possible evidence available to divine the intent of a police officer using a
question-first procedure should be factored into a question-first analysis, given the
rarity of the interrogating officer’s admission of deliberate use of question-first
procedure.
156. See Capers, 627 F.3d at 470.
157. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2006) (officer
testifying that “we had already discussed the robberies prior to me writing this, and I
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admission is significant because the Supreme Court stated that it had
to look at facts that demonstrated the question-first procedure, even
though the interrogating officer in Seibert admitted intent to use the
question-first procedure, “[b]ecause the intent of the officer will
rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here (even as it is likely to
determine the conduct of the interrogation).”158 Although both the
Third and Eleventh Circuits have considered the admitted intent of
police to forgo giving Miranda warnings in question-first cases,159 in
addition to the requisite consideration of other factors, their
treatment of police admissions of deliberateness contrasted starkly.
In United States v. Green, the Third Circuit relied on police
admissions of intent to withhold Miranda warnings as a sufficient
basis for rendering a suspected drug dealer’s postwarning statements
inadmissible.160 Given the testimony provided by the interrogation
officer “that he intentionally refrained from advising Green of his
Miranda rights prior to showing the video,”161 the Third Circuit held
that “Seibert dictates that Green’s post-Miranda statements162 which
relate to his pre-Miranda admissions are presumptively
inadmissible.”163 In examining the police officer’s intent to evade
Miranda, the court highlighted the police officer’s statement that he
executed a “strategy” to “not Mirandize [the suspect] until he saw the
video,”164 due in part to the officer’s prior knowledge of the suspect’s
familiarity with Miranda.165
Additionally, in United States v.
McBride, the District Court decided that the suspect’s post-Miranda
statements were inadmissible because the police admitted to
deliberate use of the question-first procedure.166 In Gonzalez-Lauzan,
went back and while I was writing, I was also talking with him to get the further
details”).
158. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 614–17 n.6.
159. This case presents the uncommonly straightforward circumstance of an officer
openly admitting that the violation was intentional. But the inquiry will be
complicated in other situations probably more likely to occur. Id. at 626 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting).
160. United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176, 191 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Seibert, 542
U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
161. Id.
162. The post-Miranda statements were a product of express questioning that
immediately followed the pre-Miranda interrogation. Id. at 191.
163. Id. at 191.
164. Id. (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 185 n.8.
166. United States v. McBride, Crim. No. SA-06-CR-374, 2007 WL 102153, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2007) (finding that the interrogating officer admitted to
“strategically decid[ing] before the interview not to provide any Miranda warnings so
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however, the Eleventh Circuit found that the admitted intent of three
officers to forgo providing Miranda warnings to a suspect did not
require the exclusion of the suspect’s subsequent post-warning
statements,167 despite a series of interrogations similar to those
conducted by the Third Circuit in Green.168
The circuit courts offer various justifications and criticisms in
question-first cases involving police admission of a deliberate
execution of the question-first procedure. In Green, the interrogating
officer openly stated at the suppression hearing that he intentionally
refrained from advising the suspect of his Miranda rights prior to
showing the video, and the court held that the suspect’s post-Miranda
statements which relate to his pre-Miranda admissions were
inadmissible unless the court determined that the second
interrogation session was carried out under sufficiently different
circumstances so as to have cured the initial taint.169 However, in a
question-first case where, “[p]rior to the interrogation, the detectives
had decided not to provide [the suspect] with Miranda warnings for
fear that [the suspect] would again refuse to speak with them,”170 the
United States Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion holding
that “no two-step interrogation technique of the type that concerned
the Court in Seibert undermined the Miranda warnings [the suspect]
received.”171 Generally, however, courts begin their question-first
inquiry with the pre-Miranda statement elicited by police use of the
question-first procedure.172 This section therefore focuses on tests
that circuit courts have developed to evaluate whether the factors
they use are fulfilled.
that he could gather background information to ‘determine [Defendant’s] level of
truthfulness and degree of cooperation’”); see also United States v. Renken, 474 F.3d
984, 988 (7th Cir. 2007); Wilkerson v. State, 424 A.3d 703, 719 (Md. 2011) (finding
that courts should look to “the totality of the objective and subjective evidence” only
if a police admission of deliberate use of the question-first procedure is absent
(quoting United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 479 (2d Cir. 2010))); State v. Knapp,
700 N.W.2d 899, 903–04 (Wis. 2005).
167. United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1130 (11th Cir. 2006)
(noting that the “three officers made a decision not to administer Miranda warnings
to the suspect at the beginning of this meeting”).
168. 541 F.3d at 176.
169. Id. at 191 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
170. Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 28 (2011).
171. Id. at 31.
172. The large quantity of decisions that focus on the necessity of Miranda in the
pre-Miranda stage warrants their discussion, even though these situations may not
technically fall under the ambit of Seibert.
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Pre-Miranda Questioning and Statements

Typically, courts first inquire into the length and completeness of
the pre-Miranda questioning173 and statements.174 To undermine the
Miranda warning, the initial interaction between a suspect and the
police must constitute a custodial interrogation,175 which typically
requires Miranda warnings to be administered before the
interrogation may begin.176 Some courts, however, have found that
police did not execute a question-first procedure because initial
Miranda warnings were not required due to an exception to the
Miranda requirement with respect to the circumstances surrounding
the questioning.177 Other courts find initial Miranda warnings
unnecessary due to the type of questioning during the pre-Miranda
stage.178
With respect to length of pre-Miranda questioning, some courts
found it relevant to the pre-Miranda stage of the question-first
inquiry whether pre-Miranda questioning was “short and cursory,”179
or consisted of “one”180 or a similarly “limited number of

173. See United States v. Phillips, No. 08-96-GFVT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111823,
at *33–34 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 31, 2008); see also United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565,
575 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2007).
174. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138 (11th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d 390, 407 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (quoting
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). See infra Part III for an
evaluation of the term “extended interview.”
175. In Miranda, the Court held that statements made by a defendant while under
custodial interrogation may not be used against him at trial, unless the prosecution
proved that certain procedural safeguards were implemented to insure that the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was protected. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id.
176. United States v. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding
that the suspect was not in custody when he was interrogated, thereby invalidating
any subsequent Miranda violation).
177. See United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Thomas, 381 F. App’x. 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pacheco-Lopez,
531 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th
Cir. 2007); Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765, 786–87 (D.C. 2006) (Schwelb, J.,
concurring).
178. See United States v. Hernandez, No. 05-20158, 2012 WL 601869, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 23, 2012); United States v. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d 390, 403 (W.D. Tenn.
2011) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980)).
179. United States v. Phillips, No. 08-96-GFVT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111823, at
*33–34 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 31, 2008).
180. United States v. Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2007).
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questions.”181 With respect to the length of pre-Miranda statements,
courts also found it relevant to the question-first inquiry whether a
brief statement could overlap significantly with a detailed postMiranda statement182 or needed to be systematic and exhaustive to
constitute a deliberate question-first procedure.183
Many courts have justified the failure to provide Miranda warnings
during the initial stage of questioning as exceptions to the Miranda
requirement.184 Other courts have voiced criticism of the use of
exceptions. In United States v. Woodruff, the court found that the
interrogating officer should have known his question was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.185 In contrast, in United
States v. Hernandez, the court asked whether it was “a foregone
conclusion” that such a question would elicit information indicating
criminal activity.186

2.

Relationship Between Pre-Miranda and Post-Miranda
Statements

Circuit courts take slightly different approaches to the relationship
between pre- and post-Miranda statements. Some courts focus
exclusively on how related pre- and post-Miranda statements are to
each other.187 Other courts require that pre-Miranda and postMiranda statements overlap.188 This factor is significant because

181. United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 575 (1st Cir. 2010).
182. United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138 (11th Cir. 2006).
183. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600,
616 (2004)). See infra Part III for an evaluation of the meaning of the term
“extended interview.”
184. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (finding that
questioning required for police safety does not violate Miranda); United States v.
Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that asking questions about
when and how Lopez arrived at a household ostensibly linked to a drug sale, as well
as his origin, are relevant to an investigation and cannot be described as related only
to securing the house or identifying the defendant, and that administrative concerns,
such as a defendant’s name, address, height, or weight, might permit questioning
without a Miranda waiver).
185. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
301 (1980)).
186. United States v. Hernandez, No. 05-20158, 2012 WL 601869, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 23, 2012).
187. United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520,
525 (8th Cir. 2004).
188. Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 849 (D.C. 2007); Woodruff, 830 F.
Supp. 2d at 407.
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“[r]eference to the prewarning statement [is] an implicit suggestion
that the mere repetition of the earlier statement was not
independently incriminating.”189
Courts have justified their treatment of the relationship between
pre-Miranda questioning and statements in two main ways: either the
statements must overlap or the statements must be related. For
example, in United States v. Torres-Lona, the Eighth Circuit found
no overlap where the post-Miranda statement was not identical to the
pre-Miranda statement.190 Analogously, in Woodruff, the court found
little overlap due to the different content of the two stages of
questioning.191
In contrast, in Edwards the D.C. Court of Appeals criticized the
focus on overlap by courts. Specifically, the court argued that
different pre- and post-Miranda statements that addressed the same
crime were indicative of a deliberate question-first procedure because
“limiting Seibert to full confessions would encourage police to
withhold Miranda warnings at the beginning of interrogations and
bring the suspect to the brink of confessing.”192 The relationship
between pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements influences how
police may reference a pre-Miranda statement during a subsequent
post-Miranda interrogation.193 For example, a police officer may
learn new information that allows her to ask informed, open-ended
questions.

189. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621 (2004).
190. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007).
191. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
192. Edwards, 923 A.2d at 850; see also Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1141 (finding that the
appellant’s post-Miranda confession that he had received a gun in exchange for
driving two people to a liquor store was related to his pre-Miranda admission that he
had handled the gun); Mashburn, 406 F.3d at 309 (holding that when a “questionfirst” strategy is deliberately employed, “postwarning statements related to the
substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are
taken before the postwarning statements are made”); United States v. Aguilar, 384
F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2004); cf. United States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521, 523 (7th
Cir. 2011) (finding that asking where a suspect had gotten the cocaine base found in
his pocket was related to suspect’s subsequent post-Miranda statements because it
addressed the same crime).
193. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Referencing Pre-Miranda statements in Post-Miranda
Interrogation

Most courts evaluate whether post-Miranda questioning referenced
pre-Miranda statements194 and ask whether the police confronted the
suspect with her prior statements.195 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
did not include this factor in its question-first analysis.196 The
Eleventh Circuit’s omission is significant given the extent of
treatment that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence devoted to it.197 Courts
justify the reference to a pre-Miranda statement during a subsequent
post-Miranda interrogation factor as part of their application of either
the plurality approach or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Courts
justify omitting this factor by taking into account other factors, such
as the experience of the officer.198

4.

Curative Measures

Circuit courts treat curative measures similarly, though there are
several slight variations. Some circuit courts factor curative measures
including continuity in interrogating officers and temporal and spatial
proximity between interrogations into evaluating deliberateness.199
For example, courts that apply the totality approach to evaluate
194. The Supreme Court refers to this factor as “[treatment of] the second round
as continuous with the first.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615; see Hairston v. United States,
905 A.2d 765, 781 (D.C. 2006) (finding that the second phase was not “continuous
with the first” in that in the first session the interrogating officer posed no questions
to the suspect about the details of the murder, as he did in the second phase).
195. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that
there is nothing to suggest that Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents
improperly confronted the suspect with his prior false statement in an effort to have
it repeated); United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the suspect was not directly confronted with her prior statements, and
that she was asked open-ended rather than leading questions); United States v.
Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1139 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he officers did not have
prewarned incriminating statements with which to cross-examine [the suspect] in
order to pressure him to repeat them and thereby undermine the Miranda
warnings.”).
196. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006) (failing to ask
whether the police relied upon the unwarned statements of the suspect in their
second round of questioning despite the officer’s testimony that “we had already
discussed the robberies prior to me writing this, and I went back and while I was
writing, I was also talking with him to get the further details” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
197. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (finding that post-Miranda
questioning that referenced pre-Miranda statements resembled a cross-examination).
198. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 2010).
199. Id.
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whether a question-first procedure was deliberate incorporate those
three considerations into their initial analysis.200 The Second Circuit
justifies applying the curative factors to a deliberateness analysis and
curing a finding of deliberateness because the curative factors
illustrate evidence of a deliberate question-first procedure.201 Other
courts ask whether these factors dissipated the impact of a prior
deliberate question-first procedure.202 Some courts follow additional
factors that Justice Kennedy suggests in his concurrence, including
asking whether police advised the suspect that his prior pre-Miranda
statements are inadmissible.203

5.

Burden of Proof

Although Justice Kennedy’s four factors are the key to the
substantive question of law, the procedural issue of burden of proof
on this issue was not addressed by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and
lower courts have properly treated that as an issue of first
impression.204 Specifically, the issue of whether the suspect or law
enforcement bears the burden of proof of deliberateness, and the
level of that burden, has been debated by both commentators and
circuit courts since Seibert was decided in 2004.205 Multiple circuit

200. United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2006).
201. Capers, 627 F.3d at 484.
202. Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 557 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding no change in
time, interrogating officer identity, or location).
203. The factors stated by Justice Kennedy, which also include the temporal,
spatial, and personal continuity factors, are defendant-focused rather than intentfocused. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf.
Capers, 627 F.3d at 485 n.6 (“When analyzing deliberateness, however, courts may
consider an experienced officer’s failure to warn a suspect that an earlier admission,
known to the interrogating officer, is inadmissible. Indeed, such an omission on the
part of the interrogating officer is probative of a ‘calculated’ plan to subvert
Miranda.”); see also Coomer v. Yukins, 533 F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding
as reasonable the admission of subsequent statements elicited after several hours had
passed since her first oral confession because police informed the defendant that
“circumstances had changed [and] that she was now in custody”); Hairston v. United
States, 905 A.2d 765, 781 (D.C. 2006) (finding close temporal proximity between
phase one and phase two of police interrogations of the suspect, and that the sessions
were conducted in the same interview room with the same interrogating officer in
both stages).
204. Capers, 627 F.3d at 478 (citing Williams, 435 F.3d at 1158 n.11) (finding that
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is silent as to which party bears the burden of proving or
disproving deliberateness).
205. See Daniel S. Nooter, Is Missouri v. Seibert Practicable?: Supreme Court
Dances the “Two-Step” Around Miranda, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1093, 1113 (2005)
(discussing burden of proof in question-first analysis generally).
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courts merely “eyeball” the evidence with respect to a potential
question-first tactic,206 while other circuits place the burden of proof
on the defendant.207 Most circuits and commentators, however,
believe that the prosecution should bear the burden of proof.208
Additionally, among those courts in favor of requiring a burden of
proof, at least three different standards of proof have been applied.209
Courts and commentators have various justifications regarding
their treatment of the burden of proof with respect to the deliberate
question-first procedure. In the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Court of
Appeals, the courts argued that “placing that burden on the
prosecution is consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions that
require the government to prove the admissibility of a confession
before it may come into evidence.”210 The Eighth Circuit has raised
the criticism that “the law generally frowns on requiring a party to
prove a negative.”211 One commentator, Daniel Nooter, disagrees
with this view, however, arguing that “[j]ust as a criminal defendant
does not affirmatively have the burden of disproving that an officer
reasonably acted to uphold public safety, the defendant should not
have the burden of disproving the exception Seibert recognizes for
non-deliberate two-step interrogation.”212
206. United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142 (8th Cir. 2006).
207. United States v. Tolutau, No. 2:12-CR-22 CW, 2012 WL 1898879 (D. Utah
May 23, 2012) (holding that the defendant has not met his burden of showing that law
enforcement deliberately engaged in the interrogate-first technique proscribed in
Seibert and is, therefore, not entitled to have his post-Miranda confession excluded
from evidence at trial).
208. United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that it is
the government’s burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “the
police did not deliberately withhold the warnings until after they had an initial
inculpatory statement in hand”); United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th
Cir. 2007) (“[W]here a defendant alleges that his post Miranda statement was
obtained in the course of a two part interrogation, the prosecution bears the burden
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to provide
warnings at the outset of interrogation was not deliberate.”); United States v.
Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2006) (“When a defendant challenges the
voluntariness of a confession, the burden is on the government to show that a waiver
of Miranda rights was the result of a defendant’s own free and rational choice in the
totality of the circumstances.”); Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 848 (D.C.
2007) (citing United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142–43 (8th Cir. 2006)).
209. Nooter, supra note 205, at 1113–15 (discussing burden of proof standards
including proof by a preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing
evidence).
210. Edwards, 923 A.2d at 848 (citing Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1142–43).
211. Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1143.
212. Nooter, supra note 205, at 1114. This commentator also argues that to the
extent a non-deliberate use of two-step interrogation forms an exception to the
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Moreover, Nooter criticizes courts that merely “eyeball” questionfirst procedures, reasoning that a “clear delineation of evidentiary
burdens is required to ensure the consistent application of Seibert
across jurisdictions.”213 Additionally, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in
Seibert criticizes courts that choose to eyeball the evidence, rather
than assigning a burden of proof.214 In particular, Justice O’Connor
argues, “there is no reason to believe that courts can with any degree
of success determine in which instances the police had an ulterior
motive.”215
Regarding the applicable standard of proof, a
commentator argues that “[a] clear-and-convincing standard would
not only prevent Seibert from being a dead-letter protection for
defendants, but would provide the incentive for officers to read
Miranda as soon as a suspect’s custodial status is clear.”216
III. RESOLUTION: A QUESTION-FIRST ANALYSIS THAT
ACCURATELY APPLIES MISSOURI V. SEIBERT AND THE POLICIES
AND P RECEDENT OF M IRANDA
Part III proposes a three-part resolution to the problem of the
circuit courts’ conflicting applications of the Seibert opinions. First,
this Part proposes the adoption of the test used by the Second
Circuit,217 Third Circuit,218 Fourth Circuit,219 Fifth Circuit,220 Eighth
Circuit,221 and Eleventh Circuit,222 rather than the other circuits’ use of

plurality’s rule in Seibert, such an exception should resemble the “public safety”
exception recognized in Quarles and analogized to by Justice Kennedy. Id. (citing
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 619 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
213. Id. at 1113.
214. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 627 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 626 (quoting W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4(e) (3d ed. 1996))
(emphasis added).
216. Nooter, supra note 205, at 1115.
217. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2010).
218. United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2008).
219. United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2005).
220. United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in a 5-4 decision, and decided the case on
narrower grounds than the majority.”).
221. United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence to be controlling because it provided the fifth vote necessary
for a majority and because it was decided on narrower grounds than the plurality
opinion).
222. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because Seibert
is a plurality decision and Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the narrowest
grounds, it is his concurring opinion that provides the controlling law.” (citing United
States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1136 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006))).
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the plurality test or the wasteful dual application of both tests.223
Next, this Part proposes the adoption of the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits’ strict adherence approach,224 which requires that courts
adhere solely to the factors applied in Justice Kennedy’s analysis,225 as
opposed to strict adherence to the plurality’s factors or an ad hoc
inquiry into the totality of the evidence.226 Third, this Part proposes
several clarifications to the factors used by the subset of circuit courts
that use Justice Kennedy’s test.
A. In Support of an Intent-Based Approach
Justice Kennedy’s intent-based approach, followed by the Second
Circuit,227 Third Circuit,228 Fourth Circuit,229 Fifth Circuit,230 Eighth
Circuit,231 and Eleventh Circuit,232 should be followed for several
reasons. First, Justice Kennedy’s approach is justified by questionfirst precedent established by the Supreme Court in Elstad. In
Elstad, the Court stated that
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple
failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the
suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory
process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is
ineffective for some indeterminate period.233

223. See supra Part II.A.
224. United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2006); Street, 472
F.3d at 1313-14.
225. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
226. See United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 470 (2d Cir. 2010).
227. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2010).
228. United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2008).
229. United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2005).
230. United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in a 5-4 decision, and decided the case on
narrower grounds than the majority.”).
231. United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence to be controlling because it provided the fifth vote necessary
for a majority and because it was decided on narrower grounds than the plurality
opinion).
232. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because Seibert
is a plurality decision and Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the narrowest
grounds, it is his concurring opinion that provides the controlling law.” (citing United
States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1136. n.6 (11th Cir. 2006))).
233. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
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The term “calculated” modifies both “any actual coercion” and
“other circumstances.” The Supreme Court’s statement logically
implies that a question-first procedure that, unlike Elstad, includes
“actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the
suspect’s ability to exercise his free will”234 will render a subsequent
post-Miranda procedure ineffective. Furthermore, in Elstad, the
Supreme Court focused on the accidental nature of the police
officer’s failure to provide initial Miranda warnings, reasoning that
such question-first procedures were merely “technical” and
unintentional violations of Miranda that did not require exclusion of
post-Miranda statements. Significantly, the Seibert plurality states
that “it is fair to read Elstad as treating the living room conversation
as a good-faith Miranda mistake, not only open to correction by
careful warnings before systematic questioning in that particular case,
but posing no threat to warn-first practice generally.”235
Justice Kennedy’s opinion therefore is justified in its focus on
deliberateness of the suspect’s post-Miranda statements because
Elstad focuses on deliberateness to deny suppression of the postMiranda statements. Indeed, Justice Kennedy expressly discusses the
facts of Elstad and distinguishes them from the facts of Seibert,
reasoning that the police officers in the latter case deliberately
withheld Miranda warnings at the outset of the interrogation, only
giving them after they had extracted a confession from the suspect,
and then, during this second stage of the interrogation, referred back
to statements made during the pre-Miranda interrogation.
Courts should also follow Justice Kennedy’s concurrence because it
represents the narrowest grounds for the Seibert decision. In Marks,
the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.”236 Courts have defined one opinion as narrower
when it “is a logical subset of other, broader opinions”237 and
represents a “common denominator” of the judgment.238 The

234. Id.
235. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004).
236. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
237. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
238. Schindler v. Clerk of the Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 345 n.5 (7th Cir. 1983).
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narrowest grounds analysis does not always apply, however.239 In
particular, where the plurality and concurring opinions take distinct
approaches and are mutually exclusive, no common denominator can
represent the majority of a court decision.240 Accordingly, various
courts have held that the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence are mutually exclusive. For example, in Heron, the
Seventh Circuit argued that intent could not constitute the narrowest
grounds of the Seibert majority, based on the circuit court’s
conclusion that seven of the Justices in Seibert had argued against
focusing on intent.241
The two opinions, however, are not mutually exclusive. Justice
Kennedy’s intent-based approach is used by both the plurality
opinion and Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Indeed, the plurality
opinion supports the consideration of intent in multiple instances to
evaluate whether post-Miranda statements should be suppressed in
question-first cases. First, the plurality describes Seibert’s facts as “by
any objective measure reveal[ing] a police strategy adapted to
undermine the Miranda warnings,”242 while describing the questionfirst procedure in Elstad as “arguably innocent.”243 By focusing on
the strategy of the police and the innocence of the interrogating
officers, the plurality clearly considers intent in determining whether
the post-Miranda warning was ineffective in the question-first
procedure. Moreover, the plurality interpreted Elstad as rejecting the
“cat out of the bag” theory that unintentional, pre-Miranda warnings
produced a psychological impact on the suspect that rendered
Mirandized statements involuntary.244
Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which comprises one of the Seibert
majority’s five votes, provides evidence of the plurality’s support of
an intent-based approach, while stating its own requirement for an
intent-based approach. Justice Breyer states, “I consequently join the
plurality’s opinion in full. I also agree with Justice Kennedy’s opinion
insofar as it is consistent with this approach and makes clear that a

239. See generally Heather Bailey New, Determining the Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions in the Fifth Circuit, 20 APP. ADVOC. 112, 115
(2007).
240. Ass’n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1254 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
241. United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2009).
242. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 (2004).
243. Id. at 615.
244. Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985)).
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good-faith exception applies.”245 Justice Breyer’s agreement with the
plurality’s opinion in full, while still endorsing Justice Kennedy’s
requirement that “good-faith” executions of the question-first
procedure by police did not render the subsequent Miranda warning
effective, shows that, on some level, the plurality examined intent.
Thus, in addition to affirming the correctness of Justice Kennedy’s
focus on intent, the Seibert plurality clearly considered police intent
to be a focal point of the question-first inquiry.
Justice Kennedy advocates a multifactor test like the plurality, but
narrows its scope to deliberate, as opposed to unintentional,
executions of the question-first procedure. At least one critic246 of
Justice Kennedy’s approach, however, argues that the plurality rejects
any consideration of intent, and locates this rejection in a footnote
that states the following: “Because the intent of the officer will rarely
be as candidly admitted as it was here (even as it is likely to
determine the conduct of the interrogation), the focus is on facts
apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at work.”247 The
final clause of this sentence refers to the admitted intent of police
officers as a fact. Because the plurality lists admitted intent as a fact,
among other facts that are used by the plurality to evaluate a
potentially improper question-first procedure, this approach verifies
looking to police intent as one ground for determining that a
question-first procedure is improper. In addition, the phrase “facts
apart from intent” indicates that facts in addition to admitted intent
must be sought, not that facts rather than intent must be focused
upon.
Justice Kennedy’s narrower intent-based ground for
suppression of post-Miranda statements is not distinct from the

245. Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy evidently agreed with this
characterization of his intent-based approach, describing his approach as “a narrower
test.” Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Critics have argued, however, that this
characterization applies to the applicable factors rather than the focus of the test
itself. See infra Part III.B for an argument refuting this contention.
246. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and
Patane Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 678 n.196 (2006); James J.
Tomkovicz, Saving Massiah from Elstad: The Admissibility of Successive Confessions
Following a Deprivation of Counsel, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 736 n.172
(2007); Stewart J. Weiss, Missouri v. Seibert: Two-Stepping Towards the Apocalypse,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 945, 975 (2005).
247. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 n.6 (arguing that the Seibert plurality did not adopt
the bad faith test because Justice Souter acknowledged in a footnote that police
officers rarely admit to bad faith and therefore Miranda should focus “on facts apart
from [police officer] intent”).
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plurality’s grounds, and, therefore, represents the single controlling
opinion of Seibert.248
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supports the key policy underlying
Miranda in its approach to the question-first procedure. The primary
purpose of the Miranda warning is to protect the Fifth Amendment
rights of the criminal suspect from the inherently coercive
atmosphere of custodial interrogations. Relying on Elstad, both the
three-Justice plurality and two concurring opinions in Seibert held
that the interrogating officer’s question-first procedure violated the
“general goal of deterring improper police conduct [and] the Fifth
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence.”249 Both Seibert
and Elstad also emphasized that the concerns underlying the Miranda
rule must be accommodated to law enforcement interests,250 including
the admissibility of reliable evidence, and other objectives of the
criminal justice system.251
Justice Kennedy’s deliberateness approach should be the sole
precedent set by Seibert, because he correctly balances the concerns
underlying custodial interrogations.252 Justice Kennedy begins his
justification for his intent-based approach by stating, “An officer may
not realize that a suspect is in custody and warnings are required.
The officer may not plan to question the suspect or may be waiting
for a more appropriate time.”253 Deterring unintentional actions is

248. Even if the plurality rejected using the multifactor test as an inquiry into the
intent of police, which it does not, it nonetheless includes police intent as a rationale
for holding that a suspect’s Miranda warning was not understood, thereby
establishing a common denominator with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
249. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 619–20 (Kennedy, J. concurring); Elstad, 614 U.S. at 308
(citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974)). According to Justice Kennedy,
“[e]vidence is admissible when the central concerns of Miranda are not likely to be
implicated and when other objectives of the criminal justice system are best served by
its introduction.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618–19 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Note that
Justice Kennedy, similarly to the plurality, employs curative measures to evaluate the
ability of the suspect to understand his or her right against self-incrimination that
Miranda is intended to protect. Id. at 619. This conception of curative measures
further establishes overlap between the two opinions.
250. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (finding that courts evaluating constitutional issues must
undertake a balancing operation with the correct decision seen as the one yielding
the greatest net benefit).
251. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644–45 (2004).
252. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 619 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he scope of the
Miranda suppression remedy depends on a consideration of those legitimate interests
and on whether admission of the evidence under the circumstances would frustrate
Miranda’s central concerns and objectives.”).
253. Id. at 620.
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unnecessary, unlike deterring intentional actions, which can prevent
further reccurrences. The argument regarding trustworthiness is
slightly more complicated.
Given Justice Kennedy’s specific
exclusion of unintentional two-step interrogations, the goal of
assuring trustworthy evidence no longer seems to be the main focus.
Indeed, confessions given by suspects who did not fully understand
their Miranda warnings, due to unintentional failures to administer
pre-Miranda warnings, may be prone to subsequent deception, such
as post-Miranda questioning predicated upon pre-Miranda
statements, and would therefore be less trustworthy.
Justice
Kennedy’s approach, however, prevents this outcome and safeguards
trustworthiness by focusing on post-Miranda cross-examining of a
suspect predicated on their pre-Miranda statements as a key factor in
evaluating deliberateness.
Under the plurality’s approach, however, an unintentional
question-first interrogation could render a post-Miranda statement
inadmissible, even though improper police conduct was totally absent
and the post-Miranda statements were unrelated to the prior preMiranda statements and were unaddressed by police. The focus of
the plurality on the defendant has been incorrectly repeated by circuit
courts that apply the plurality’s approach and Justice Kennedy’s
approach alike.254 This mistake encourages courts to determine that
the defendant was negatively affected and, as a result, suppress the
defendant’s post-Miranda statement without considering the relevant
factors and the policy underlying Elstad and Seibert.
B.

Courts Should Strictly Adhere to the Factors Set Forth by
Justice Kennedy

Courts should focus on four factors to adhere properly to Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence.255 First, courts should focus upon whether a
two-step interrogation was deliberate, as opposed to examining
whether such an interrogation exerted a coercive impact on the

254. United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (“We attempt to approximate what the defendant could understand only
because we typically do not know what the defendant did understand.”); see also
English, supra note 111, at 455 (arguing that a suspect-centric perspective fails to
adequately condemn or limit the question-first tactic).
255. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While Justice Kennedy,
unlike the plurality, does not explicitly lay out a test to demonstrate how courts
should arrive at the conclusion that a two-step interrogation was deliberate, his
analysis still creates the functional equivalent of a test due to the specific factors he
employs. See id. at 618–22.
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suspect.256 Second, courts should examine whether the interrogating
officers referenced the suspect’s unwarned confession in their
subsequent warned interrogation.257 Third, the court should examine
whether the suspect’s subsequent warned statements relied upon his
or her prior unwarned statements.258 If these three considerations do
indicate deliberateness, the courts should look to a fourth
consideration: whether there were curative measures and whether the
police cured the suspect of the coercive impact caused by the police’s
deliberate interrogation strategy.259 Justice Kennedy applied this
preceding consideration for a variety of reasons.
First, the focus of Justice Kennedy’s inquiry is on facts relevant to
the use by police of a deliberate question-first tactic by the police, as
opposed to the impact on the suspect’s ability to understand his rights
under Miranda.260 This factor is important because courts can justify
admission of a coerced statement by incorrectly examining the effect
of a failure to provide a suspect’s initial Miranda warnings on the
subsequent Miranda warning and ignoring evidence indicating
intentional use of a question-first procedure.
Second, Justice Kennedy discusses the coercive effect of postMiranda questioning that is predicated on pre-Miranda statements
elicited by police. Specifically, Justice Kennedy discusses—for a full
paragraph—the fact that the interrogating officer in Seibert
confronted the defendant with her inadmissible prewarning
statements and pushed her to acknowledge them.261 In Seibert,
according to Kennedy’s concurrence, the interrogating officer crossexamined the suspect based on his prior related or overlapping
unwarned statements.262 Justice Kennedy’s focus on this issue

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 622.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (“It is an unwarranted extension of

Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by
any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s
ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent
voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.”).
261. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Note that a law
enforcement officer may still deliberately predicate a line of questions upon a prior
unwarned admission, which itself was not deliberately elicited, and, in doing so,
employ a deliberate question-first procedure. Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the
issue of “cross-examin[ing]” a suspect with the contents of his unwarned confession
supports this interpretation. Id.
262. Id.
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illustrates that an interrogating officer’s reliance on the defendant’s
prewarning statement to obtain the postwarning statement must be
highly relevant to a finding that a deliberate two-step interrogation
occurred.263
Third, Justice Kennedy repeatedly states that postwarning
statements that are related to the substance of prewarning statements
must be excluded if resulting from a deliberate two-step
interrogation.264 The plurality, rather than Justice Kennedy, identifies
the higher standard of overlap between the pre-Miranda and postMiranda statements as relevant to a question-first inquiry.265 Justice
Kennedy’s lower threshold of relatedness is further demonstrated by
the requirement in his final holding that suppressed post-Miranda
statements be related to prior pre-Miranda statements.266
Fourth, Justice Kennedy discusses curative measures. According
to Justice Kennedy, “a substantial break in time and circumstances
between the prewarning statement and the Miranda warning may
suffice in most circumstances, as it allows the accused to distinguish
the two contexts and appreciate that the interrogation has taken a
new turn.”267 Alternatively, an additional warning that explains the
likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement may be
sufficient.268 The curative measures exception repeats the time and
setting inquiry of the plurality multi-factor test, which, although
utilizing a suspect-centric perspective,269 nevertheless comprises a
mandatory consideration.270 No curative steps were taken in Seibert,
however, so the postwarning statements are inadmissible and the
263. One may argue that a problem with this reasoning is that such reliance, and,
thus, distortion of Miranda, can be equally accomplished through an unintentional
question-first procedure (once an accidental unwarned statement occurs, it seems
unfair and against the interests of Miranda for an interrogating officer to be able to
refer back to this statement in order to get the suspect to repeat their earlier
statement). Suppressing statements originating from unintentional question-first
procedures, however, cannot deter improper police conduct that is accidental. See id.
at 620 (noting that an “officer may not realize that a suspect is in custody and
warnings are required”).
264. Id. at 622.
265. Id. at 621.
266. Id. at 622 (finding that “postwarning statements that are related to the
substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are
taken before the postwarning statement is made,” where police have deliberately
executed a question-first procedure).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 622; see United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 484 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010).
269. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
270. Id.
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conviction was vacated. Justice Kennedy determined that there were
no curative measures taken by police, and that the initial questioning
was intentional, unlike in Elstad, where the unwarned statement
elicited by the officer was held to be inadvertent and police applied
adequate curative measures.271 Lower courts that apply a Seibert
analysis of question-first interrogation cases should adopt the four
aforementioned factors.
Adherence to Justice Kennedy’s factors, as opposed to strict
adherence to the plurality’s factors or an ad hoc inquiry into the
totality of the evidence, is correct for several reasons. First, Justice
Kennedy states that his multifactor test is limited to analyzing the
intent of police in question-first cases, and excludes use of the
multifactor test to illustrate unintentional question-first procedures.272
Specifically, he favors a “narrower test” that would be inapplicable to
unintentional question-first procedures and “applicable only in the
infrequent case, such as we have here, in which the two-step
interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine
the Miranda warning.”273
Further, Justice Kennedy separates curative measures from his
deliberateness inquiry, while distinguishing those factors as
defendant-focused, and not intent-focused.274 This distinction of
curative factors is affirmed in Elstad, which held that “[w]hen a prior
statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between
confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in
identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has
carried over into the second confession.”275 Because these curative
factors—temporal and geographic continuity, change in police
personnel, and advisement that any pre-Miranda statements are
inadmissible—are defendant-focused, they cannot use these factors in
an inquiry limited to deliberateness. Thus, the majority of circuit
courts that incorrectly apply these factors to Justice Kennedy’s
inquiry into deliberateness violate precedent. Additionally, the
process of applying the curative factors to both the deliberateness and
curative inquiries is inefficient because it asks the same three
questions twice.276

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985).
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 622.

Id.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310.
United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Circuits that cherry-pick curative factors from the plurality test or
elsewhere and insert them into the deliberateness inquiry do not
follow Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. For example, in Capers, the
Second Circuit uses the totality of the evidence approach, which
considers types of evidence, such as the officer’s experience, which
neither the plurality nor Justice Kennedy view as factors.277 The
Second Circuit’s decision is questionable because it emphasizes
factors that are not considered in Seibert, yet dismisses as a non-issue
the most heavily emphasized factor in Justice Kennedy’s analysis—
reference to pre-Mirandized statements—by simply noting that the
interrogating officer “made no reference . . . to the statements Capers
had already made during the initial interrogation.”278
Similarly, in Street, the Eleventh Circuit, using a cherry-picking
approach, focuses on irrelevant considerations, and does not examine
the clear relatedness of the pre- and post-Miranda statements or the
interrogating officer’s referencing of the suspect’s prior statement.279
Although there may be a slight lack of guidance regarding the relative
weight of various factors,280 circuit courts violate stare decisis when
they ignore the presence of factors expressly applied in Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence.281 Furthermore, courts that use all of the
plurality factors,282 or add additional factors not considered by the
Seibert opinions,283 violate Marks because such considerations are not
a logical subset of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
The following analysis addresses the proper application of the
factors articulated by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence.

277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 480.
Id. at 473.

United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006).
Seth Goldberg, Missouri v. Seibert: The Multifactor Test Should Be Replaced
with A Bright-Line Warning Rule to Strengthen Miranda’s Clarity, 79 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1287, 1309 (2005) (discussing the possibility that the factors from Seibert may
carry different weight (citing Medley v. Commonwealth, 602 S.E.2d 411, 420, 426
(Va. Ct. App. 2004) (Benton, J., dissenting))).
281. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618–22 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
282. Id. at 604–17 (plurality opinion).
283. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 470 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668-69 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williams, 435
F.3d 1148, 1158 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2006).
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Proper Application of Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence and
Related Question—First Considerations

The factors that comprise Justice Kennedy’s test also require
clarification on an individual basis, given their inconsistent
application by lower courts. As an initial matter, a police admission
that the police intended to execute a question-first procedure should
be sufficient to suppress any post-Miranda statements, subject to
curative measures. Such an admission is significant because the
Supreme Court stated that it had to look at facts that demonstrated
the question-first procedure, even though the interrogating officer in
Seibert admitted intent to use the question-first procedure,284 only
“[b]ecause the intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted
as it was here (even as it is likely to determine the conduct of the
interrogation).”285 Indeed, it is inefficient to conduct a question-first
inquiry into the intent of interrogating officers when police have
given credible testimony that they deliberately executed a questionfirst procedure.286

1.

Pre-Miranda Violation

Many courts determine that a question-first procedure was
deliberate by evaluating whether the first unwarned statement
elicited by police violated Miranda, as opposed to falling within a
booking, noncustodial, listening, safety, or other exception.287
284. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 614–17.
285. Id. at 616 n.6.
286. But see Capers, 627 F.3d at 482 (“Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Seibert
does not advocate a test whereby a deliberate two-step interrogation will be found
only when a law enforcement officer admits to executing such a strategy.”).
287. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (finding that
questioning required for police safety does not violate Miranda); United States v.
Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that the interrogating officer asked
questions to establish probable cause, not to circumvent Miranda warnings); United
States v. Thomas, 381 F. App’x 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that “casual
conversation” does not rise to the level of interrogation); United States v. PachecoLopez, 531 F.3d 420, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that “asking questions about
when and how Lopez arrived at a household ostensibly linked to a drug sale, as well
as his origin, are relevant to an investigation and cannot be described as related only
to securing the house or identifying the defendant” and that administrative concerns,
such as a defendant’s name, address, height, or weight, might permit questioning
without a Miranda waiver); United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir.
2007) (finding that illegal aliens are not entitled to Miranda warnings); Hairston v.
United States, 905 A.2d 765, 786–87 (D.C. 2006) (Schweilb, J., concurring) (finding
that presenting a suspect with incriminating evidence and instructing the suspect to
listen does not violate Miranda).
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Because application of Seibert’s inquiry hinges on an initial Miranda
violation, courts must correctly determine when a pre-Miranda
statement has been elicited by police in violation of Miranda. When a
failure to Mirandize an in-custody suspect does not fall under an
exception to Miranda, any interrogation that is reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response violates Miranda.288

2.

Completeness of Initial Pre-Miranda Warning and Statements

The completeness of the initial pre-Miranda warning and preMiranda statements should be treated by courts as a relevant, though
non-dispositive, factor. While the plurality lists completeness as one
of the first factors,289 Justice Kennedy appears to, at most, indirectly
refer to the completeness of the pre-Miranda interrogation in his
conclusion: “When an interrogator uses this deliberate, two-step
strategy, predicated upon violating Miranda during an extended
interview, post-Miranda statements that are related to the substance
of pre-Miranda statements must be excluded absent specific, curative
steps.”290 Justice Kennedy’s conclusion appears to include the term
“extended interview,” possibly appearing to indicate that an extended
interview was necessary for a court to find police use of a deliberate
question-first procedure. The term, however, is used in reference to
the entire question-first procedure, because the extended interview
includes the continuing violations of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment
privileges during the second part of the interrogation, which takes
place after the administration of the Miranda warning. Unlike the
plurality factors such as overlapping statements and continuing
interrogations, Justice Kennedy does not use the plurality factor
addressing completeness of pre-Miranda questioning and statements
or move it to his curative measures analysis. Thus, courts that rule
out a deliberate question-first procedure, where a short round of
questioning or a short statement by the suspect occurred, violate
Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion.
Unfortunately, several circuits still incorrectly apply this factor. In
Street, the Eleventh Circuit evaluated a potential question-first
procedure, where a suspect was asked about his involvement in a
robbery and gave several “incriminating statements,” although the
288. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980) (finding that words or actions
that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response can constitute the
functional equivalent of an interrogation).
289. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.
290. Id. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

6/26/2013 8:39 PM

INTERROGATION FIRST

1137

“more damaging statements” were elicited following a Miranda
warning.291 Due to the statements’ and interrogation’s brevity,292 the
court held that police did not execute a deliberate question-first
procedure.293 But in fact, an entire confession can be uttered in three
words. For example, in Gonzalez-Lauzan, the Eleventh Circuit
argued that the suspect’s statement “made during the unwarned
interrogation . . . , ‘okay, you got me,’” was too short and lacking
detail to fulfill the plurality’s completeness factor (which the court
should not have applied in the first place).294 In addition, the court
supported its decision by improperly using dicta from the plurality
opinion, stating, “there was little, if anything, of incriminating
potential left unsaid,” which described the facts in Seibert, rather than
a controlling standard.295
The type of short but highly relevant information provided in preMiranda statements in Street and Gonzalez-Lauzan can provide a
foundation for police to ask informed related Mirandized questions,
and circumvent the Miranda warning. A complete initial round of
questions and answers is less likely to be part of a deliberate questionfirst procedure. Police can use short questions and statements,
however, as part of a question-first procedure. As such, completeness
of pre-Miranda questioning and statements should function as a
relevant factor, but, in contrast to Street and Gonzalez-Lauzan,
should not unilaterally determine whether police executed a questionfirst procedure.

3.

Relationship Between Pre-Miranda and Post-Miranda
Statements

The relationship between pre-Miranda and post-Miranda
statements also requires clarification. The D.C. Court of Appeals and
the Eighth Circuit use the correct approach regarding the relatedness
of a suspect’s pre-Miranda statements to her post-Miranda
statements. Both courts reason that, at a minimum, a suspect’s preMiranda and post-Miranda statements must relate “to the same

291. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1212 (11th Cir. 2006).
292. Id. at 1314.
293. Id.
294. United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616).
295. Id. (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616).
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crime.”296 Instead of overlap, which, at best, follows the plurality and
Justice Kennedy’s dicta, relatedness is rooted in Justice Kennedy’s
principal holding. Further, as the D.C. Court of Appeals stated in
Edwards, focusing on relatedness, as opposed to overlap, prevents
police from eliciting incriminating information until the confession is
about to occur, and then administering Miranda warnings at the last
moment. Additionally, pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements
need not be inculpatory. Quoting the decision of the Supreme Court
in Miranda, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that
[t]he warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with
our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent,
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a
defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which
are direct confessions and statements which amount to “admissions”
of part or all of an offense . . . . Similarly, for precisely the same
reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements
and statements alleged to be merely “exculpatory.” If a statement
made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be
used in the prosecution.297

Exculpatory statements do not necessarily indicate the absence of a
deliberate question-first procedure because police can deceptively
bring the suspect to the brink of confessing, and then use the
purportedly exculpatory pre-Miranda statements to minimize the step
to the subsequent post-Miranda confession from the defendant’s
perspective.298
In contrast, the Second Department of the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of the State of New York held in People v.
McMillon that police had not executed a deliberate question-first
procedure because the suspect’s pre-Miranda statements were not
incriminating.299 Indeed, the suspect had not provided inculpatory
statements while subject to custodial interrogation for three hours
before police provided him with Miranda warnings.300 The D.C.

296. United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
appellant’s post-Miranda confession appellant’s post-Miranda confession that he had
received a gun in exchange for driving two people to a liquor store was related to his
pre-Miranda admission that he had handled the gun); Edwards v. United States, 923
A.2d 840, 849 (D.C. 2007).
297. Edwards, 923 A.2d at 850 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77
(1966)).
298. See id.
299. People v. McMillon, 816 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
300. Id. at 170.
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Court of Appeals’s acceptance of both exculpatory and inculpatory
statements is superior, however, because it focuses on the preMiranda statement’s effect on the Miranda warning, rather than
whether the pre-Miranda statement is purportedly exculpatory, since
it may still relate to the post-Miranda statements.301
Police who learn from elicited pre-Miranda statements which
questions they should ask during the post-Miranda stage can also
game the overlap.302 Relatedness deters such conduct by including
any post-Miranda statements that are related to the same crime
referenced in the pre-Miranda stage. Further, relatedness protects
suspects from the inherently coercive custodial environment that
diminishes the trustworthiness in the absence of the Miranda
safeguard.

4.

Referencing Pre-Miranda Statements in Post-Miranda
Interrogation

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence devotes a large portion to the police
officers’ confrontation of the defendant with her inadmissible preMiranda statements.303 This emphasis demonstrates the high level of
importance of this factor in his question-first analysis. Note that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is unclear as to whether a law
enforcement officer has employed a deliberate two-step interrogation
strategy where the officer deliberately predicated a line of questions
upon a prior unwarned statement, which itself was not deliberately
elicited.304 Justice Kennedy’s repeated emphasis on the fact that the
police “cross-examined” the suspect in Seibert with the contents of
her unwarned confession, and on the deterrence of improper police
circumvention of Miranda, seems to support an interpretation that
such a question-first procedure would still be deliberate.
In addition, Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on referencing preMiranda statements during post-Miranda interrogation is further
justified by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Elstad. Specifically, the
Court observed in Elstad that the police officers did not “exploit the
unwarned admission,”305 which contributed to their finding that the
police officer did not execute a deliberate question-first procedure.306
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Edwards, 923 A.2d, at 851–52.
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Id.
Id.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985).

Id. at 318.

RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1140

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

6/26/2013 8:39 PM

[Vol. XL

The importance Justice Kennedy attributed to the police practice of
predicating post-Miranda questioning on pre-Miranda statements
calls into question circuit decisions such as Capers and Street, where
courts found that police did not use a deliberate question-first
procedure.307 Thus, the type of question-first procedure that falls
within Justice Kennedy’s narrow concurrence addresses the police
practice, where officers deliberately first obtained unwarned
incriminating statements from a suspect, and then used those
incriminating statements in the warned interrogation in order to
undermine the midstream Miranda warnings.

5.

Curative Measures

Courts’ application of the measures Justice Kennedy uses to cure a
deliberate question-first procedure should adhere strictly to the
factors advanced in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, and focus
exclusively on the suspect’s impression of the mid-interrogation
Miranda warning. Courts’ inclusion of curative measures in Justice
Kennedy’s deliberateness inquiry are incorrect because Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence follows Elstad’s use of the curative measures
as intervening factors, the sole purpose of which is to dissipate the
impact of a deliberate question-first procedure.308 Curative measures
should include continuity in personnel, physical location, and breaks
in time.309 Additionally, police advisement of the inadmissibility of a
suspect’s prior pre-Miranda statements is a factor under Justice
Kennedy’s curative measures exception.310 The Second Circuit,
however, takes the unwarranted added step of including it in the
deliberateness inquiry:
Consideration of whether or not curative measures were taken is an
inquiry separate and apart from determining deliberateness. When
analyzing deliberateness, however, courts may consider an
experienced officer’s failure to warn a suspect that an earlier
admission, known to the interrogating officer, is inadmissible.

307. See supra notes 277–83 and accompanying text.
308. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 341–42 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (stating that a suspect’s
post-Miranda statements could not fairly be attributed to the statements taken in
violation of Miranda if “a meaningful intervening event actually occurred”); Missouri
v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
309. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
310. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy’s advisement is
grounded in Elstad, though the Elstad majority does not mention it. See Elstad, 470
U.S. at 298 (majority opinion).
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Indeed such an omission on the part of the interrogating officer is
probative of a “calculated” plan to subvert Miranda.311

The Second Circuit’s application of Justice Kennedy’s police
advisement factor concerning the admissibility of the suspect’s prior
pre-Miranda statement to the deliberateness inquiry is incorrect
because Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the advisement factor is
solely defendant-focused.312

6.

Burden of Proof

After addressing Justice Kennedy’s factors directly, it is helpful to
discuss the issue of burden of proof with respect to police use of the
question-first procedure. Traditionally, courts place the burden of
proof on the prosecution in criminal cases.313 Moreover, “when a
defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession, the burden is
on the government to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was the
result of a defendant’s own free and rational choice.”314 Courts
should place a burden of proof on the prosecution to disprove
deliberateness for a variety of reasons.315
First, courts that merely “eyeball” whether post-Miranda
statements resulting from a question-first procedure should be
suppressed are prone to arbitrary decision making in the absence of a
burden of proof. In particular, Justice O’Connor, in her Seibert
dissent, criticizes courts that choose to “eyeball” the evidence, rather
than assign a burden of proof, arguing that “there is no reason to
believe that courts can with any degree of success determine in which
instances the police had an ulterior motive.”316 At least one circuit

311. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 485 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010).
312. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
313. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is “bottomed
on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free”).
314. United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–65 (1986); United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d
452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004)).
315. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d
1135, 1142–43 (8th Cir. 2006).
316. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4(e) (3d ed. 1996)) (emphasis added).
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argues that the burden should be placed on the defendant.317 Second,
the plurality states that the burden rests on the prosecution,318 and
Justice Kennedy’s holding is the narrower ground and does not reject
the plurality’s placement of the burden of proof on the prosecution.
Additionally, at least one court has criticized any requirement that
forces the prosecution to prove a negative.319 The Eighth Circuit,
however, which also requires the prosecution to disprove
deliberateness, cautioned that while “the law generally frowns on
requiring a party to prove a negative,” the Supreme Court has
consistently required the government to prove the admissibility of a
criminal defendant’s confession.320 Thus, at the very least, when a
defendant alleges that his post-Miranda statement was elicited by a
deliberate question-first procedure, the prosecution bears the burden
of establishing (at least) by a preponderance of the evidence321 that
the failure to provide warnings at the outset of interrogation was not
deliberate.322
This burden of proof requirement will shape police conduct by
disincentivizing question-first interrogations.
Specifically, the
prosecution will be unable to prove beyond even a preponderance of
the evidence that police did not deliberately execute a question-first
procedure. For example, in Capers, the Second Circuit held that
[o]nce a law enforcement officer has detained a suspect and subjects
him to interrogation . . . there is rarely, if ever, a legitimate reason to
delay giving a Miranda warning until after the suspect has confessed.

317. Moreno, supra note 129, at 397–98 (finding that Justice Kennedy’s intentbased approach places an impossible and inappropriate burden on the defendant,
who must now prove that a particular police officer acted in bad faith).
318. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608 n.1 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169); Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975)) (finding that the prosecution bears the burden of
proving, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Miranda warning was
effective).
319. Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1143.
320. Id.
321. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]henever the
State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the
defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need
prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Connelly, 479 U.S.
at 168) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
322. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007); Ollie, 442 F.3d
at 1143; see also United States v. Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943, 955 (7th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (2008) (finding that it is the prosecution’s burden
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “the police did not deliberately
withhold the warnings until after they had an initial inculpatory statement in hand”).
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Instead, the most plausible reason . . . is an illegitimate one, which is
the interrogator’s desire to weaken the warning’s effectiveness.323

Thus, the burden of proof can constrain police execution of the
question-first by forcing the prosecution to show evidence that
justifies the omission of Miranda warnings.

7.

Application of Holistic Question-First Approach

Russell Hart’s case324 underscores how the circuit courts’ confusion
can impact a suspect’s Fifth Amendment protection.325 When Hart’s
case came before the District of Nebraska, the Eighth Circuit had
correctly decided to treat Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as
controlling.326 Three years earlier, however, the Eighth Circuit
applied the factors from the Seibert plurality to determine the impact
of an apparent question-first procedure on the post-Miranda
confession.327
In Hart, the trial court correctly followed Eighth Circuit precedent
and Justice Kennedy’s intent-based approach. The court, however,
incorrectly treated the three factors regarding the temporal, spatial,
and geographic proximity between pre- and post-Miranda
interrogations as part of the inquiry into the initial effectiveness of
the Miranda warning.328
The court’s adherence to the factors applied by Justice Kennedy in
Seibert also had serious shortcomings. With respect to Hart’s preMiranda statements, the court found that the interrogating officer’s
inquiry into the length of time Hart had been in Nebraska and
whether Hart had registered in Nebraska as a sex offender was
reasonably likely to elicit information related to a violation of the
“Adam Walsh” laws.329 This finding belies the court’s later reasoning

323. Capers, 627 F.3d at 480–81 (quoting United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148,
1159 (9th Cir. 2006)).
324. United States v. Hart, No. 4:10CR3088, 2010 WL 5422900 (D. Neb. Nov. 30,
2010).
325. U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.”).
326. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758–59 (8th Cir. 2007).
327. United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 523–25 (8th Cir. 2004).
328. Defendant Hart was questioned both times in the same booking room, at least
one officer was present during both stages of questioning, and only thirty minutes
passed between the two sessions of questioning. Hart, 2010 WL 5422900, at *1.
329. Id. at *4 (“The law enforcement officers should have known that follow-up
questions regarding Hart’s residency and registration status were directly related to a
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that the question-first procedure was not deliberate because “[t]he
initial questioning was the spontaneous result of the booking
process,” rather than a “plan.”330 The court also raised the circular
argument that the question-first procedure was legal because the
police lacked any official question-first policy. Given that Seibert
provided a multifactor test because police “rarely” admit to executing
question-first procedures,331 the presence of such a policy is
unnecessary and unlikely.332
The District Court’s most significant error arose in its
determination of the relatedness of Hart’s pre-Miranda and postMiranda statements, and whether the interrogating officer relied on
the defendant’s pre-Miranda statement to obtain the post-Miranda
statement used against Hart.333 The relatedness of Hart’s pre- and
post-Miranda statements, which is notably absent from the District
Court’s analysis, is self-evident since both sets of Hart’s statements
are identical. Further, the District Court incorrectly concluded that
the police did not refer to Hart’s pre-Miranda admissions while
administering his Mirandized interrogation.334 Indeed, after initially
eliciting the fact that Hart had yet to register as a sex offender beyond
the acceptable time period, the police believed Hart had committed
an Adam Walsh violation in Nebraska. As a result, the police
“contacted the Marshal’s office in Lincoln to gather information on
the elements of the crime and an outline of questions to ask”335 before
providing Hart with Miranda warnings and resuming the
interrogation. Thus, the police clearly relied upon the first statements
in the subsequent stage, given that they arranged multiple questions
based solely upon Hart’s previous pre-Miranda admissions.336 The
District Court’s incorrect application of Seibert permitted the use of a

potential violation of the Adam Walsh laws and could cause Hart to incriminate
himself.”).
330. Id. at *6.
331. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 n.6 (2004).
332. United States v. Stewart, 191 F. App’x 495, 499 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding it
“unlikely that in the wake of Seibert and the cases interpreting it, that a law
enforcement agency would maintain an official policy that invites suppression
motions under Seibert”).
333. Hart, 2010 WL 5422900, at *6.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at *1.
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question-first procedure that enables police to undermine the
meaning and effect of Miranda.337
CONCLUSION
The resolution of the conflict between the circuit courts regarding
the proper approach to evaluating question-first procedures is a
desirable goal that would help achieve consistency in the lower courts
and predictability for police officers conducting custodial
interrogations. The Supreme Court and dissenting circuit courts
should adopt the intent-based approach of the Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits because the approach adheres to
the precedent set by Elstad, represents the narrowest grounds of
Seibert, and furthers the policy underlying Miranda. Furthermore,
courts that conduct an inquiry into the deliberateness of a questionfirst procedure should follow both the strict adherence approach of
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,338 and the foregoing clarifications of
the various dimensions of question-first analysis. Failure to do so
risks violating stare decisis, the jurisprudence and policy underlying
Miranda, and any hope of consistency in the examination of
potentially deliberate question-first procedures.
Criminal parole violator Russell Hart was deprived of his Miranda
rights because the Nebraska police deliberately executed a questionfirst procedure. As a result, Hart was compelled to confess and his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination were violated. The
lack of uniformity and clarity in the circuits with respect to questionfirst cases and the multidimensional analysis involved in such cases
likely contributed to this outcome. A holistic resolution to the circuit
court conflicts will, ideally, help reinforce Seibert and bring clarity to
question-first law.

337. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
338. United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006).

